
KAMPUCHEA:

INVASION & RESISTANCE



REPRINTS OF CURRENT NEWSPAPER AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES, PREPARED BY: THE KAMPUCHEA SUPPORT COMMITTEE, BOSTON ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

- I. BACKGROUND
- II. THE INVASION
- III. RESISTANCE
- IV. INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS

INCLUDES BIBLIOGRAPHY AND RESOURCE LISTING

Kampuchea Support Committee

STATEMENT OF UNITY AND PURPOSE:

The recent invasion and military occupation of Democratic Kampuchea by Vietnam came as a shock to people throughout the world. Government leaders, newspapers, and a wide range of international organizations have spoken out in defense of Democratic Kampuchea, and there have been protest demonstrations around the world.

Here in the United States prominent intellectuals, journalists, Cambodian residents, people active in the anti-war movement, and many others have voiced their opposition to Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. Shortly after the invasion over 1000 people demonstrated in several American cities in defense of Cambodia's independence, and activities are underway throughout the country to provide information about the present situation.

The Kampuchea Support Committee seeks to serve as a national focal point for this concern.

Our organization has a single point of unity: We support the current struggle of the Kampuchean people, led by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, to restore their country's national independence. In this light we oppose Vietnam's invasion and armed occupation of Cambodia.

Based on this point of unity, we see the following as the main tasks of our

organization:

1) to provide information to the American people about the continuing resistance in Cambodia; about the background of the Vietnamese invasion and the role of the Soviet Union within it; about the culture and life of the Kampuchean people; and about their efforts to rebuild and develop their country prior to the invasion.

2) to explore all efforts to lend concrete support to the Kampuchean struggle; in terms of material aid, organization of speaking tours to present Cambodian points of view to various audiences in the United States, and campaigns to protect Kampuchea's national art treasures from depredation and pillage.

3) to oppose any attempt to recognize the Vietnamese-sponsored "Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation," which owes its existence to the

Vietnamese invasion.

4) to bring public pressure to bear on the United Nations, the US government, and other organizations to deny all forms of aid or support for Vietnam so long as it remains in occupation of Kampuchea.

We will seek to accomplish these tasks through educational programs; dissemination of literature, films and other informative material; and through open forums for broad public discussion of the international, regional and domestic issues relating to Democratic Kampuchea.

We welcome endorsements and support from individuals and organizations including community and student groups, professional organizations, religious groups and trade unions. Anyone who agrees with the principles and tasks of this national support organization for Kampuchea is encouraged to join us.

c/o Rene Theberge, 298 Chestnut Ave.,	
I would like more information. I would like to become a member.	Enclosed are \$5. yearly dues.
NAME	PHONE
ADDRESS	

FE' IN DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

Senous and claimers known as Cambodia is a country in the Article Asia of Seproximited 20,000 square miles with a country of 8 million problem rates than 92% live in small villages of was dominated by check history and a Kampachez mile a calony though it garred independent on a 1953 is was natively dominated by the United States, which instigated a calo in 1976 in April 1975 the United States, which instigated a calo in 1976 in April 1975 the United States, which instigated a calo in 1976 in April 1975 the United States, which instigated a calo in 1976 in April 1975 the United States, which instigated a calo in 1976 in April 1975 the United States, which instigated a calo in 1976 in April 1975 the United States, which instigated a calo in 1976 in April 1975 the United States was defined by the Khiner Rouge and Democratic Kampaches was established. During the life on this calony than were used during the entire second world at

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FOOD PROBLEM

SOLVED IN 2 YEARS

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BACKGROUND

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CONTROL OF WATER KITS

Elizabeth Booker writes: "The latting impression I came away with of sural life in Camboors was a tableau of score of peasants, clad in black, tending abundant rice fields. Their leader constantly told at that the people had become masters of they own lives by becoming insisters of the water. If you control water, you do not suffer drought in the dry season or floods in the raige season; one official said. You control disease became the water runs quickly and smoothly. You allow firm to be abundant. The whole atmosphere is fresh."

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"All hilks Vietnam," one official said, two will never have to bee for aid." (W.shington Pest, December 29, 1978)

LIFE IN CO-OFERATIVE

Elizabeth Becker writes about the La Bo so-operative. To seemed to be almost entirely self-sustaining. Besides its clear buts, the cooperative had a large bambou chicken coop, near vegetable plots around the hories and, we were told a pigpen farther out in the fleids. Near the dominant coning half and patio was a foundry where agricultural impressents were produced. Inventiveness was in evid-noe exceptions. One man was possing a bicycle bellows while another methes down

LIFE IN DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

Kampuchea, formerly known as Cambodia, is a country in Southeast Asia of approximately 70,000 square miles with a population of 8 million people. More than 98% live in small villages. It was dominated by major Hindu states till the 14th century. In the mid-19th century, France made Kampuchea into a colony. Though it gained independence in 1953, it was heavily dominated by the United States, which instigated a coup in 1970. In April 1975, the US-backed regime was defeated by the liberation movement led by the Khmer Rouge and Democratic Kampuchea was established. During the liberation struggle, more bombs were dropped by the US on this small country than were used during the entire second world war.

Ever since the liberation of Kampuchea, the Western news media and governments have been waging a propaganda campaign claiming mass killings, starvation and forced labor in Kampuchea. The Indian media have followed suit. The Soviet Union and its satellites have joined this chorus in the past fifteen months or so. But these "reports" have not been substantiated by anyone who has actually visited Kampuchea. Jan Myrdal, the Swedish writer, Professor Francois Rigaux from Belgium, delegations from France, Denmark and Norway, journalists from the US weekly, "The Call," and high-ranking officials from Japan, Korea, China, Romania, Algeria and Yugoslavia have all refuted the existence of forced labor, starvation or genocide. Instead they testified to the magnificent progress this small country was making.

In early December, Elizabeth Becker, Washington Post correspondent in Cambodia from 1973 to 1974, and Richard Dudman, chief Washington correspondent for the St Louis Post-Dispatch, made a two-week 1000-mile tour of Kampuchea. These two journalists, unlike most earlier visitors, were not particularly friendly to the Kampuchean government. However, despite their personal dislike for the system of government, they were forced by what they saw to refute the atrocity stories and substantiate the remarkable achievements of the Kampuchean revolution.

NO FORCED LABOR

Richard Dudman wrote in the Miami Herald on December 27, 1978: "What I found in two weeks of touring the new Cambodia - under strict government supervision but with good opportunity for observation - was a regimented life of hard work in the fields for most Cambodians. This life is leavened, however, by much improved housing, regular issuance of clothing, and an assurance of adequate food. I did not find the grim picture painted by the thousands of refugees who couldn't take the new order. Those who remain appear to be reasonably relaxed at the height of the busy harvest season. They sometimes lean on their hoes like farmworkers everywhere. And they often stare and then smile and wave at the rare sight of a Western face. Workers usually appeared to be operating under their own direction. There was no sign of government cadres giving orders or of armed guards to enforce the working hours."

And this is what Elizabeth Becker wrote in the Washington Post on December 29, 1978: "Most of the evidence attesting to the horrors that have taken place in Cambodia has been furnished by the thousands of refugees who have fled the country, and I saw little indication of these problems during a very strictly supervised government tour.

*For all I had heard before my trip about how poorly the new

system in Camhodia was working, I was a bit surprised by the general level of production throughout the country. I have no way to be sure, of course, that all the figures given me were accurate. But the evidence that I saw suggested that the figures could not be too misleading."

FOOD PROBLEM SOLVED IN 2 YEARS

At the time of liberation, Kampuchea was poorer than even India. Following the devastation by the US during the war, the situation looked hopeless in 1975. The country had little industry and no production other than agriculture. Yet within two years this country has solved its food problem. Even the CIA has had to acknowledge this. "We admit at being surprised that the rice harvest was as bountiful as refugees claim," reads a March 31 report. "Much would seem to have beer against it: spotty rainfall, many fields tilled for the first time in years, former city people not knowing what they are doing and the lack of chemical fertilizer." A later report says, "In the pilot's village near Samrong, people [attempted] to grow three crops of rice last year - and the people found themselves in the unique position of harvesting and planting rice at the same time." (Taken from the US State Department "evidence" manual against the Kampuchean government, reported in The Call, November 20, 1978). This is a remarkable achievement.

CONTROL OF WATER KEY

Elizabeth Becker writes: "The lasting impression I came away with of rural life in Cambodia was a tableau of scores of peasants, cladin black, tending abundant rice fields. Their leaders constantly told us that the people had become masters of their own lives by becoming 'masters of the water.' 'If you contro! water, you do not suffer drought in the dry season or floods in the rainy season,' one official said. 'You control disease because the water runs quickly and smoothly. You allow fish to be abundant. The whole atmosphere is fresh.'

"The government magazine, Democratic Kampuchea, and of ficial films are replete with photographs of the man-made dams and irrigation canal systems that have been built around the country by work brigades since 1975. Without this irrigation system, the officials said, there would have been no possibility of becoming self-sufficient in food so quickly.

"'We could not wait to send our engineers to higher schools; that would have taken years,' an official explained at one of the three dam sites we visited. 'We had to learn through experience and these are crude but they suit our purposes.' But for the most part, the dams seem to work. This year, Cambodia suffered its worst drought in 70 years, losing 10 percent of its crops, officials told us. But I could see as we toured the coun tryside that replanting had already begun, and the government said it still plans to export rice.

"'Unlike Vietnam,' one official said, 'we will never have to beg for aid.'" (Washington Post, December 29, 1978)

LIFE IN CO-OPERATIVE

Elizabeth Becker writes about the Le Bo co-operative: "It seemed to be almost entirely self-sustaining. Besides its clean huts, the cooperative had a large bamboo chicken coop, neat vegetable plots around the homes and, we were told, a pigpen farther out in the fields. Near the communal dining hall and patio was a foundry where agricultural implements were produced. Inventiveness was in evidence everywhere. One man was pedaling a bicycle bellows while another melted down

"As we drove down Route 4, the road leading to the seaport of Kompong Som, I noticed that one lane had been blocked off. A work brigade was using the cement for winnowing and sorting the rice from the chaff after harvest." (Washington Post, December 29, 1978)

Even Phnom Penh grows food: "I walked past the market, which now has banana trees densely planted around its empty stalls. Gardens seeded with vegetables and young fruit trees had replaced the front lawns of many deserted homes on side streets." (Washington Post, December 26, 1978)

INDUSTRY

About industry, Elizabeth Becker noted that rubber was under full production. "At Cham Chan Do, we were first escorted through a former French-run rubber factory which was operating smoothly and efficiently the day of our tour. Discarded machinery from around the country had been put to use there. From previous reporting I had done on rubber manufacturing in Cambodia, this operation looked to me to be both efficient and producing high-quality rubber. Officials later told us that Cambodia was exporting 35,000 tons of rubber to Singapore, China and North Korea. They said Cambodia was also exporting kapok to Japan, and rice to Madagascar and other African nations." (Washington Post, December 29, 1978)

HOUSING FOR PEASANTS

Kampuchea's housing program is truly remarkable. Richard Dudman reports: "At the same time it is in the midst of one of the world's great housing programs. Simple but attractive wooden houses in several styles are going up by the thousands all over the country to replace the old thatched huts that used to become infested with insects and mice and rot away in a few seasons. I had lived in some of those old-style peasant huts when I was captured by Communist guerrillas and held prisoner for a few weeks in 1970. That experience made it possible to contrast the old life in the countryside with life under the new order.

"At a typical development, workmen were erecting 16 new wooden houses with tile roofs, set on stilts in the traditional style to keep them above the annual floods. Similar scenes were observed all over the country.

"Almost everything needed for the new homes came from the immediate vicinity. Concrete footings to keep the wooden stilts out of the dirt and away from the wood-boring insects had been cast at a cement works just down the road. The roof tiles had been made at a neighboring kiln. Workmen were sawing lumber by hand from logs brought from a nearby teak forest. All the necessary tools – saws, sawblades, hatchets, hammers, and plane irons had been manufactured at a local blacksmith shop, mostly from pieces of old US military equipment. In accordance with Cambodia's insistence on self-reliance, the houses required only two items not available on the spot – steel screws imported from China to install the hinges for the louvered shutters, and the whetstones used to sharpen the locally made tools.

"The new houses are twice the size of the small huts they replace. Design features of the new houses suggest the work of a clever architect. Imaginative roof lines have stylish variations to break the monotony. Gables sometimes have a bit of carpenter's gingerbread, and the front steps and porches have latticed railings. Officials said, however, that no architect was required – only the traditional artistry of the Cambodian peo-

4

ple dating from the days when Angkor Wat was built. Herald, December 27, 1978)

KAMPUCHEA AND INDIA

How can such a small country make such progress in short time? The achievements of Kampuchea show that an exploitative system is abolished and people gain contheir lives, a tremendous energy is released. Relying pletely on the local population and local resources (seance), a country can completely change its appearance has made little progress in the last thirty years in important the lot of poor peasants; we can learn a lot from Kamp

(An excellent pamphlet, Kampuchea Today, written first Americans to visit that country since liberation in available for \$2.25 from The Call, P.O.Box 5597, Chic 60680)

-- Article by I.P.A.N.A. (Indian People's Association in North America

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BOOKS & THE ARTS

istortions at Fourth Hand

AM CHOMSKY and WARD S. HERMAN

May 1, 1977, The New York Times fished an account of the "painful blems of peace" in Vietnam by Fox hic terfield. He describes the "woes" of people of the South, their "sense of dship" and the grim conditions of Ife, concluding that "most Southers are said to appear resigned to fate." His evidence comes from plomats, refugees and letters from tnam." In journals of the War Reers League and the American Friends rice Committee of March-May 1977, contrast, there are lengthy reports by ol Bragg on a visit to Vietnam earlier year by a six-person AFSC delegaincluding two who had worked in tnam and are fluent in Vietnamese. group traveled widely in the South spoke to well-known leaders of the -Communist Third Force who are ve in the press and government, as as ordinary citizens. They report ressive social and economic progress he face of the enormous destruction by the war, a "pioneering life" that difficult and at times discouraging," everywhere "signs of a nation reding" with commitment and dedica-

utterfield claims that "there is little fiable information on the new ecoic zones-no full-time American espondents have been admitted since war-but they are evidently not ular." While it is true that American espondents are not welcomed in nam, there is nonetheless ample exeyewitness testimony, including that journalists of international repute, ing Vietnamese professors from ada, American missionaries and rs who have traveled through the itry where they worked for many s. Jean and Simonne Lacouture pubd a book in 1976 on a recent visit, cal of much of what they saw but ig a generally very positive account reconstruction efforts and popular mitment. Max Ediger of the MenGEORGE C. HILDEBRAND and GARETH PORTER. Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution. Monthly Review Press (1976).

FRANCOIS PONCHAUD. Cambodge Année Zéro. Juilliard Press. Paris (1977).

JOHN BARRON and ANTHONY PAUL. Murder of a Gentle Land. Thomas Y. Crowell (1977).

nonite Central Committee, who worked in Vietnam for many years and stayed for thirteen months after the war, testified before Congress in March 1977 on a two-week return visit in January, also conveying a very favorable impression of the great progress he observed despite the "vast destruction of soil and facilities inflicted by the past war." There have also been positive accounts of the "new economic zones" in such journals as the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Canadian Pacific Affairs.

But none of this extensive evidence appears in The New York Times's analysis of "conditions in Indochina two years after the end of the war there." Nor is there any discussion in the Times of the "case of the missing bloodbath," although forecasts of a holocaust were urged by the U.S. leadership, official experts and the mass media over the entire course of the war in justifying our continued military presence. On the other hand, protests by some former anti-war individuals against alleged human rights violations in Vietnam are given generous coverage. This choice of subject may be the only basis on which U.S.—as opposed to Soviet—dissidents can get serious attention in the mass media today.

The technical name for this farce is "freedom of the press." All are free to write as they wish: Fox Butterfield, with his ideological blinders, on the front page of the Times (daily circulation more than 800,000); and Carol Bragg, with her eyewitness testimony, in New England Peacework (circulation 2,500). Typically, reports which emphasize the destruction caused by the United States and the progress and commitment of the Vietnamese reach a tiny circle of peace activists. Reports that ignore the American role—Butterfield can only bring himself to speak of "substantial"

tracts of land made fallow [sic] by the war," with no agent indicated—and that find only "woes" and distress, reach a mass audience and become part of the established truth. In this way a "line" is implanted in the public mind with all the effectiveness of a system of censorship, while the illusion of an open press and society is maintained. If dictators were smarter, they would surely use the American system of thought control and indoctrination.

It was inevitable with the failure of the American effort to subdue South Vietnam and to crush the mass movements elsewhere in Indochina, that there would be a campaign to reconstruct the history of these years so as to place the role of the United States in a more favorable light. The drab view of contemporary Vietnam provided by Butterfield and the establishment press helps to sustain the desired rewriting of history, asserting as it does the sad results of Communist success and American failure. Well suited for these aims are tales of Communist atrocities, which not only prove the evils of communism but undermine the credibility of those who opposed the war and might interfere with future crusades for freedom.

It is in this context that we must view the recent spate of newspaper reports, editorials and books on Cambodia, a part of the world not ordinarily of great concern to the press. However, an exception is made when useful lessons may be drawn and public opinion mobilized in directions advantageous to the established order. Such didacticism often plays fast and loose with the truth.

For example, on April 8, 1977, The Washington Post devoted half a page to "photographs believed to be the first of actual forced labor conditions in the countryside of Cambodia [to] have reached the West." The pictures show armed soldiers guarding people pulling plows, others working fields, and one bound man. ("It is not known if this man was killed," the caption reads.) Ouite a sensational testimonial to Communist atrocities. But there is a slight problem. The Washington Post account of how they were smuggled out by a relative of the photographer who died in the escape attempt is entirely fanciful. The pictures had appeared a year

thea. m Chomsky and Edward Herman at M.I.T. and the University of Pennmia, respectively. They are co-authors counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodin Fact and Propaganda (1973), a edition of which will be out shortly.

earlier in France, Germany and Australia, as well as in the Bangkok Post (April 19, 1976), with the caption "True or False?" In fact, an attempt by a Thai trader to sell these photos to the Bangkok Post was turned down "because the origin and authenticity of the photographs were in doubt." The photos appeared in another Thai newspaper two days before the April 4th election. The Bangkok Post then published them, explaining in an accompanying article that "Khmer watchers" were dubious about the clothes and manner of the people depicted, and quoting "other observers" who "pointed to the possibility that the series of pictures could have been taken in Thailand with the prime objective of destroying the image of the Socialist parties" before the election.

This story was reported in the U.S./ Indochina Report of the Indochina Resource Center in July 1976, along with the additional information that a Thai intelligence officer later admitted that the photos were indeed posed inside Thailand: "'Only the photographer and I were supposed to know,' he confided to a Thai journalist." The full details were again given in the International Bulletin (April 25, 1977; circulation 6,000). A letter of April 20 to The Washington Post on these points has not appeared. In short, the "freedom of the press" assures that readers of the International Bulletin will get the facts.

Even if the photographs had been authentic, we might ask why people should be pulling plows in Cambodia. The reason is clear, if unmentioned. The savage American assault on Cambodia did not spare the animal population. Hildebrand and Porter, in their Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution, cite a Cambodian Government report of April 1976 that several hundred thousand draft animals were killed in the rural areas. The Post did not have to resort to probable fabrications to depict the facts. A hundred-word item buried in The New York Times of June 14, 1976, cites an official U.N. report that teams of "human buffaloes" pull plows in Laos in areas where the buffalo herds, along with everything else, were decimated (by the American bombing, although this goes unmentioned in the Times). Much the same is true in Vietnam. Quite possibly the U.N. or the Laotian Government could supply photographic evidence, but this would not satisfy the needs of current propaganda.

The response to the three books under review nicely illustrates this selection process. Hildebrand and Porter present a carefully documented study of the destructive American impact on Cambodia and the success of the Cambodian

revolutionaries in overcoming it, giving a very favorable picture of their programs and policies, based on a wide range of sources. Published last year, and well received by the journal of the Asia Society (Asia, March-April 1977), it has not been reviewed in the Times, New York Review or any mass-media publication, nor used as the basis for editorial comment, with one exception. The Wall Street Journal acknowledged its existence in an editorial entitled "Cambodia Good Guys" (November 22, 1976), which dismissed contemptuously the very idea that the Khmer Rouge could play a constructive role, as well as the notion that the United States had a major hand in the destruction, death and turmoil of wartime and postwar Cambodia. In another editorial on the "Cambodian Horror" (April 16, 1976), the Journal editors speak of the attribution of postwar Cambodian difficulties to U.S. intervention as "the record extension to date of the politics of guilt." On the subject of "Unscrambling Chile" (September 20, 1976), however, the abuses of the "manfully rebuilding" Chilean police state are explained away as an unfortunate consequence of Allendista "wrecking" of the economy.

In brief, Hildebrand and Porter attribute "wrecking" and "rebuilding" to the wrong parties in Cambodia. In his Foreword to Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution, Asian scholar George Kahin observes that it is a book from which "anyone who is interested in understanding the situation obtaining in Phnom Penh before and after the Lon Nol government's collapse and the character and programs of the Cambodian Government that has replaced it will, I am sure, be grateful. . . . " But the mass media are not grateful for the Hildebrand-Porter message, and have shielded the general public from such perceptions of Cambodia.

In contrast, the media favorite, Barron and Paul's "untold story of Communist Genocide in Cambodia" (their subtitle), virtually ignores the U.S. Government role. When they speak of "the murder of a gentle land," they are not referring to B-52 attacks on villages or the systematic bombing and murderous ground sweeps by American troops or forces organized and supplied by the United States, in a land that had been largely removed from the conflict prior to the American attack. Their point of view can be predicted from the "diverse sources" on which they relied: namely, "informal briefings from specialists at the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council

and three foreign embassies in Washington." Their "Acknowledgments" mention only the expertise of Thai and Malaysian officials, U.S. Government Cambodian experts, and Father Ponchaud. They also claim to have analyzed radio and refugee reports.

Their scholarship collapses under the barest scrutiny. To cite a few cases, they state that among those evacuated from Phnom Penh, "virtually everybody saw the consequences of [summary executions] in the form of the corpses of men, women and children rapidly bloating and rotting in the hot sun," citing, among others, J.-J. Cazaux, who wrote, in fact, that "not a single corpse was seen along our evacuation route," and that early reports of massacres proved fallacious (The Washington Post, May 9, 1975). They also cite The New York Times, May 9, 1975, where Sydney Schanberg wrote that "there have been unconfirmed reports of executions of senior military and civilian officials. . . . But none of this will apparently bear any resemblance to the mass executions that had been predicted by Westerners," and that "Here and there were bodies, but it was difficult to tell if they were people who had succumbed to the hardships of the march or simply civilians and soldiers killed in the last battles." They do not mention the Swedish journalist, Olle Tolgraven, or Richard Boyle of Pacific News Service, the last newsman to leave Cambodia, who denied the existence of wholesale executions; nor do they cite the testimony of Father d Jacques Engelmann, a priest with nearly m two decades of experience in Cambodia, at who was evacuated at the same time and reported that evacuated priests "were not witness to any cruelties" and that there were deaths, but "not thousands, as certain newspapers have written" (cited by Hildebrand and Porter). be

Barron and Paul claim that there is no evidence of popular support for the Communists in the countryside and that people "fled to the cities" as a result of the "harsh regimen" imposed by the Communists-not the American bombing. Extensive evidence to the contrary, including eyewitness reports and books by French and American correspondents and observers long familiar with Cambodia (e.g., Richard Dudman, Serge Thion, J.-C. Pomonti, Charles Meyer) is never cited. Nor do they try to account for the amazingly rapid growth of the revolutionary forces from 1969 to 1973, as attested by U.S. intelligence and as is obvious from the unfolding events themselves.

Their quotes, where they can be checked, are no more reliable. Thus they claim that Ponchaud attributes to a

mer Rouge official the statement that sh- ple expelled from the cities "are no en- per needed, and local chiefs are free ind Espose of them as they please," implyent local chiefs are free to kill on- But Ponchaud's first report on (Le Monde, February 18, 1976)
military chief as stating that "are left to the absolute discretion the local authorities," which implies hing of the sort.

ney

om aw bese examples are typical. Where cu- is no independent confirmatory of lence, the Barron-Paul story can at- is be regarded as credible. Their ng, are of history has already appeared ote, be Reader's Digest (circulation more was 1 18 million), and has been widely and in the mass media as an authorired re account, including, among them, lay ront-page horror summary in The ork I Street Journal, an article in TV ney de (April 30, 1977; circulation more een 1 19 million) by Ernest Lefever, a of ign policy specialist who is otherknown for his argument before ear gress that we should be more tolerons of the "mistakes" of the Chilean s," a "in attempting to clear away the ies, station of the Allende period," and ere discovery of the "remarkable freerd- of expression" enjoyed by critics ans the military regime (The Miami s." and, August 6, 1974).

ur- onchaud's book is based on his own yle onal experiences in Cambodia from ws- i until the capture of Phnom Penh, the asive interviews with refugees and nor rts from the Cambodian radio. Pubher d in France in January 1977, it has irly me the best-known unread book in lia, at history, on the basis of an acme t by Jean Lacouture (in The New ests t Review of Books), widely cited and in the press, which alleges that ou- :haud has revealed a policy of "autorit- cide" (Lacouture's term) practiced r). he Communists.

the and fore looking more closely at Ponre- d's book and its press treatment, by would like to point out that apart can Hildebrand and Porter there are on-y other sources on recent events in and bodia that have not been brought re- ie attention of the American readliar public. Space limitations preclude a an, prehensive review, but such jourries as the Far Eastern Economic Retry the London Economist, the Melpid ne Journal of Politics, and others om there, have provided analyses by elli-ly qualified specialists who have un- ed the full range of evidence avail-

and who concluded that executions be numbered at most in the thouhey s that these were localized in areas

of limited Khmer Rouge influence and unusual peasant discontent, where brutal revenge killings were aggravated by the threat of starvation resulting from the American destruction and killing. These reports also emphasize both the extraordinary brutality on both sides during the civil war (provoked by the American attack) and repeated discoveries that massacre reports were false. They also testify to the extreme unreliability of refugee reports, and the need to treat them with great caution, a fact that we and others have discussed elsewhere (cf. Chomsky: At War with Asia, on the problems of interpreting reports of refugees from American bombing in Laos). Refugees are frightened and defenseless, at the mercy of alien forces. They naturally tend to report what they believe their interlocuters wish to hear. While their reports must be considered seriously, care and caution are necessary. Specifically, refugees questioned by Westerners or Thais have a vested interest in reporting atrocities on the part of Cambodian revolutionaries, an obvious fact that no serious reporter will fail to take into account.

To give an illustration of just one neglected source, the London Economist (March 26, 1977) carried a letter by W. J. Sampson, who worked as an economist and statistician for the Cambodian Government until March 1975, in close contact with the central statistics office. After leaving Cambodia, he writes, he "visited refugee camps in Thailand and kept in touch with Khmers," and he also relied on "A European friend who cycled around Phnom Penh for many days after its fall [and] saw and heard of no . . . executions" apart from "the shooting of some prominent politicians and the lynching of hated bomber pilots in Phnom Penh." He concludes "that such executions could be numbered in hundreds or thousands rather than in hundreds of thousands," though there was "a big death toll from sickness"surely a direct consequence, in large measure, of the devastation caused by the American attack. Sampson's analysis is known to those in the press who have cited Ponchaud at second-hand, but has yet to be reported here. And his estimate of executions is far from

Expert analyses of the sort just cited read quite differently from the confident conclusions of the mass media. Here we read that "Most foreign experts on Cambodia and its refugees believe at least 1.2 million persons have been killed or have died as a result of the policies of the Communist regime since April 17, 1975" (UPI, Boston Globe, April 17, 1977). No source is given, but it is

TRYING TO CHANGE THE SUBJECT

I have sworn to quit inviting antelope and elk into my small back yard, but the bear refuses to stop wandering in. His fur always gets caught in the gate and his steps on the porch rattle the glasses in my cupboard. Each time he comes the dog is nervous for a week. When he ate my blackberries I said it didn't matter but in fact I had nothing to eat all day. Yet when I tell him I've decided against him, he laughs, batting my wind chimes with his paw.

Susan Bartels Ludvigson

interesting that a 1.2 million estimate is attributed by Ponchaud to the American Embassy (presumably Bangkok), a completely worthless source, as the historical record amply demonstrates. The figure bears a suggestive similarity to the prediction by U.S. officials at the war's end that a million would die in the next year.

In The New York Times Magazine, May 1, 1977, Robert Moss (editor of a dubious offshoot of Britain's The Economist called "Foreign Report" which specializes in sensational rumors from the world's intelligence agencies) asserts that "Cambodia's pursuit of total revolution has resulted, by the official admission of its Head of State, Khieu Samphan, in the slaughter of a million people." Moss informs us that the source of this statement is Barron and Paul, who claim that in an interview with the Italian weekly Famiglia Cristiana Khieu Samphan stated that more than a million died during the war, and that the population had been 7 million before the war and is now 5 million. Even if one places some credence in this reported interview nowhere in it does Khieu Samphan suggest that the million postwar deaths were a result of official policies (as opposed to the lag effects of a war that left large numbers ill, in-

is

jured, and on the verge of starvation). The "slaughter" by the Khmer Rouge is a Moss-New York Times creation.

A Christian Science Monitor editorial states: "Reports put the loss of life as high as 2 million people out of 7.8 million total." Again, there is no source, but we will suggest a possibility directly. The New York Times analysis of "two years after the Communist victory" goes still further. David Andelman, May 2, 1977, speaks without qualification of "the purges that took hundreds of thousands of lives in the aftermath of the Communist capture of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975." Even the U.S. Government sources on which journalists often uncritically rely advance no such claim, to our knowledge. In fact, even Barron and Paul claim only that "100,000 or more" were killed in massacres and executions—they base their calculations on a variety of interesting assumptions, among them, that all military men, civil servants and teachers were targeted for execution; curiously, their "calculations" lead them to the figure of 1.2 million deaths as a result of "actions" of the Khmer Rouge governing authorities, by January 1, 1977 ("at a very minimum"); by a coincidence, the number reported much earlier by the American Embassy, according to Ponchaud. Elsewhere in the press, similar numbers are bandied about, with equal credibility.

Ponchaud's book is serious and worth reading, as distinct from much of the commentary it has elicited. He gives a grisly account of what refugees have reported to him about the barbarity of their treatment at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. He also reminds us of some relevant history. For example, in this "peaceful land," peasants were massacred, their lands stolen and villages destroyed, by police and army in 1966, many then joining the maquis out of "their hatred for a government exercising such injustices and sowing death." He reports the enormous destruction and murder resulting directly from the American attack on Cambodia, the starvation and epidemics as the population was driven from their countryside by American military terror and the U.S.incited civil war, leaving Cambodia with "an economy completely devastated by the war." He points out that "from the time of Sihanouk, then Lon Nol, the soldiers of the government army had already employed, with regard to their Khmer Rouge 'enemies,' bloodthirsty methods in no way different from those of Democratic Cambodia" (the Khmer Rouge). He also gives a rather positive account of Khmer Rouge programs of social and economic development, while deploring much brutal practice in working for egalitarian goals and national independence.

Ponchaud's book lacks the documentation provided in Hildebrand and Porter and its veracity is therefore difficult to assess. But the serious reader will find much to make him somewhat wary. For one thing, Ponchaud plays fast and loose with quotes and with numbers. He quotes an unattributed Khmer Rouge slogan, "One or two million young people will be enough to build the new Cambodia." In an article in Le Monde (February 18, 1976) he gives what appears to be the same quote, this time as follows: "To rebuild the new Cambodia, a million people are enough." Here the quote is attributed to a Khmer Rouge military commander, along with the statement misrepresented by Barron and Paul, noted above (Lacouture changes the numbers to 1.5 million to 2 million, attributes the quote to an unnamed Marxist, and concludes that it goes beyond barbarism). This is one of the rare examples of a quote that can be checked. The results are not im-

Ponchaud cites a Cambodian report that 200,000 people were killed in American bombings from March 7 to August 15, 1973. No source is offered, but suspicions are aroused by the fact that the Phnom Penh radio announced on May 9, 1975 that there were 200,000 casualties of the American bombing in 1973, including "killed, wounded, and crippled for life" (Hildebrand and Porter). Ponchaud cites "Cambodian authorities" who give the figures 800,000 killed and 240,000 wounded before liberation. The figures are implausible. By the usual rule of thumb, wounded amount to about three times killed; quite possibly he has the figures reversed.

More significant is Ponchaud's account of the evacuation of Phnom Penh in April 1975. He reports the explanation given by the revolutionary government: that the evacuation was motivated by impending famine. But this he rejects, on the ground that rice stocks in Phnom Penh would have sufficed for two months, with rationing (what he thinks would have happened after two months, with no new harvest, he does not say). He gives no source for this estimate, and fails to observe that "According to Long Boret, the old Government's last Premier, Phnom Penh had only eight days worth of rice on hand on the eve of the surrender" (Agence France-Presse, Bangkok; New York Times, May 9, 1975). Nor does he cite the testimony of U.S. AID officials that Phnom Penh had only a six-day supply of rice (William Goodfellow, New York Times, Jul-14, 1975).

In fact, where an independent checking possible, Ponchaud's account seems best careless, sometimes in rather significant ways. Nevertheless, the book is serious work, however much the preshas distorted it.

As noted, Ponchaud relies overwhelmingly on refugee reports. Thus his account is at best second-hand with many of the refugees reporting whethey claim to have heard from other Lacouture's review gives at best a third hand account. Commentary on Lacouture's review in the press, which have been extensive, gives a fourth-hand account. That is what is available to readers of the American press.

As an instance, consider The Christian Science Monitor editorial alread cited, which gives a fair sample of what is available to the American public. This editorial, based on Lacouture's review speaks of the "reign of terror agains the population" instituted by the Khmei Rouge. Lacouture, like Ponchaud, eman phasizes the brutality of the Americanwar, which laid the basis for all that followed. These references disappear fronthe Monitor editorial, which pretendthat the current suffering in Camboditakes place in an historical vacuum, asa mere result of Communist savagery Similarly, an earlier editorial (January 26, 1977), based on Barron and Paul also avoids any reference to Americanresponsibility, though there is much moralizing about those who are indifferent to "one of the most brutal and concentrated onslaughts in history" in this "lovely land" of "engaging people."

It is difficult to convey the deep cynicism of this all-too-typical reporting which excises from history the American role in turning peaceful Cambodia into a land of massacre, starvation and disease. While the editors prate about morality, people are dying in Cambodia as a direct result of the policies that they supported, and indeed concealed. Hildebrand and Porter quote a Western doctor in Phnom Penh on the mass starvation that resulted from the American war: "as well as knocking off a generation of young men, the war is knocking off a generation of children"-those who will die from the permanent damage suffered from severe malnutrition, one small part of the American legacy to this "lovely land."

To appreciate fully the cynicism of the press and editorial comments, it is necessary to recall the role of the American mass media in supporting the "secret war" against Cambodia. Prior to the Nixon-Kissinger administration, CamboJuliages had been subject to U.S.supported armed attack, invariheconed, but on occasion later conns aben it was discovered that Westgnif wers were present. The massive is against Cambodia began in ores 1969, when the "secret" B-52 are launched. In the following

pyel— Cambodian Government made Thu— efforts to bring the facts to with the shanouk appealed to the press lers— public these "criminal attacks" ird—ceful Cambodian farmers" and cou—cize abroad this very clear stand habodia" in "oppos[ing] all bombac Cambodian territory under what-rad=eext." In January 1970, his gov-

released an official White Book riscetails of U.S. attacks on civilians add ay 1969, including names, places, had gures and photographs. All of hies concealed by the American ew hich was later to claim that it not chard Nixon who kept the 1969 needment from the press and the man people.

ane was one notable exception, a ol-york Times report by William om (May 9, 1969), headed "Raids ids modia by U.S. Unprotested," dia reported B-52 raids on "Vietcong as orth Vietnamese supply dumps Typurces and disregarding Sihanouk's Il, oned protest against the murder an hare peasants, women and chilling particular."

nt let us return to the fourth-hand is account. It also refers to "rehotographs depicting forced labor ions in the countryside," namely, se already discussed, adding that have not been positively verified." gardly does justice to the facts. The or also cites "reports" that 2 mila eople have died. The only source imagine for this is Lacouture's tical question: "What Oriental desmedieval inquisitors ever boasted g eliminated, in a single year, oneof their own population?"-2 people. This statement, allegedly on Ponchaud, is quoted in the Nothing supporting this appears achaud's book, as Lacouture agrees prrections published in The New Review (May 26, 1977).

Monitor editorial writers had obin never seen the book on which
based their account of events in
badia. Rather, like the bulk of the
they selected what they wanted
cetter Citing Lacouture, they dethe terror and barbarism of the
Rouge, omitting his denunciation
American attack. Lacouture does
compare the Khmer Rouge to the

Nazis. He states that Ponchaud cites "telling articles" from a Cambodian Government newspaper and quotes a paragraph which states that "we will choose only the fruit that suit us perfectly," as distinct from the Vietnamese, who "have removed only the rotten fruit." Commenting on this passage, Lacouture states: "Perhaps Beria would not have dared to say this openly; Himmler might have done so." And he then concludes that the Cambodian revolution is "worthy of Nazi Gauleiters."

The newspaper report that elicited these judgments, on which the press uncritically relies, does appear in Ponchaud's book. The source, however, is not a Cambodian Government newspaper but a Thai newspaper, a considerable difference. The quoted paragraph was written by a Thai reporter who claims to have had an interview with a Khmer Rouge official. In his corrections, Lacouture notes the error, and adds that this Khmer Rouge official "said, as Ponchaud writes, that he found the revolutionary method of the Vietnamese 'very slow'. . . ." A more accurate statement would be that the Thai reporter claims that that is what was said-by now, a sufficiently remote chain of transmission to raise many doubts. How seriously would we regard a critical account of the United States in a book by a hostile European leftist based on a report in Pravda of a statement allegedly made by an unnamed American official? The analogy is precise. Why then should we rest any judgment on Ponchaud's account of a Thai report of an alleged statement by an unnamed Khmer Rouge official? What is certain is that the basis for Lacouture's accusations, cited above, disappears when the quotes are properly attributed: to a Thai reporter, not a Cambodian Government newspaper.

Lacouture's review contained other errors, as he notes in his corrections. Thus he attributed to "texts distributed in Phnom Penh" what in fact appear to be slogans remembered by refugees, again a rather considerable difference. None of the examples he quotes is specifically attributed by Ponchaud.

In his corrections, Lacouture raises the question whether precision on these matters is very important. "Faced with an enterprise as monstrous as the new Cambodian Government, should we see the main problem as one of deciding exactly which person uttered an inhuman phrase, and whether the regime has murdered thousands or hundreds of thousands of wretched people?" He adds that it hardly matters what were the exact numbers of the victims of Dachau

or Katyn. Or perhaps, we may add, whether the victims of My Lai numbered in the hundreds or tens of thousands, if a factor of 100 is unimportant.

If, indeed, postwar Cambodia is, as he believes, similar to Nazi Germany, then his comment is perhaps just, though we may add that he has produced no evidence to support this judgment. But if postwar Cambodia is more similar to France after liberation, where many thousands of people were massacred within a few months under far less rigorous conditions than those left by the American war, then perhaps a rather different judgment is in order. That the latter conclusion may be more nearly correct is suggested by the analyses mentioned earlier.

We disagree with Lacouture's judgment on the importance of precision on this question. It seems to us quite important, at this point in our understanding, to distinguish between official government texts and memories of slogans reported by refugees, between the statement that the regime "boasts" of having "killed" 2 million people and the claim by Western sources that something like a million have died-particularly, when the bulk of these deaths are plausibly attributable to the United States. Similarly, it seems to us a very important question whether an "inhuman phrase" was uttered by a Thai reporter or a Khmer Rouge official. As for the numbers, it seems to us quite important to determine whether the number of collaborators massacred in France was on the order of thousands, or hundreds of thousands, and whether the French Government ordered and organized the massacre. Exactly such questions arise in the case of Cambodia.

We do not pretend to know where the truth lies amidst these sharply conflicting assessments; rather, we again want to emphasize some crucial points. What filters through to the American public is a seriously distorted version of the evidence available, emphasizing alleged Khmer Rouge atrocities and downplaying or ignoring the crucial U.S. role, direct and indirect, in the torment that Cambodia has suffered. Evidence that focuses on the American role, like the Hildebrand and Porter volume, is ignored, not on the basis of truthfulness or scholarship but because the message is unpalatable.

It is a fair generalization that the larger the number of deaths attributed to the Khmer Rouge, and the more the U.S. role is set aside, the larger the audience that will be reached. The Barron-Paul volume is a third-rate propaganda

tract, but its exclusive focus on Communist terror assures it a huge audience. Ponchaud's far more substantial work has an anti-Communist bias and message. but it has attained stardom only via the extreme anti-Khmer Rouge distortions added to it in the article in The New York Review of Books. The last added the adequately large numbers executed and gave a "Left" authentication of Communist evil that assured a quantum leap to the mass audience unavailable to Hildebrand and Porter or to Carol Bragg. Contrary facts and even authors' corrections of misstatements are generally ignored or inadequately reported in favor of a useful lesson (we note one exception: an honest retraction of an editorial based on Lacouture in the Boston Globe). We noted earlier that the Monitor editorial and other press comments built on the Lacouture review offer at best a fourth-hand account. The chain of transmission runs from refugees (or Thai or U.S. officials), to Ponchaud, to The New York Review, to the press, where a mass audience is reached and "facts" are established that enter the approved version of history.

Who gains from slander campaign against Kampuchea?

For three years the newspapers and television have pictured the Kampuchean government as a bloody regime that has "massacred" from one to three million Kampucheans.

But a great amount of evidence has shown that the whole siander campaign was fabricated by US imperialism, and then taken up by the Soviet and Vietnamese invaders.

Many press reports take the figure of 1.2 million dead from Cambodge Année zéro, a book by a French priest, François Ponchaud. But where did Ponchaud get his information? Straight from the US embassy in Thailand - undoubtedly a most reliable source.

Faked atrocity pictures, like the one showing a peasant beaten to death, have been published everywhere. But the Bangkok Post revealed April 9, 1976 that they had been staged in Thailand by a Thai intelligence officer.

Among the most quoted sources are the stories of Kampuchean refugees in Thailand. The New York Times, hardly a pro-communist newspaper, reported:"The genocide myth is being fabricated by an organization working outside of Bangkok (Thailand). It is led by In-Tam, one of Lon Nol's close advisors. He paid refugees up to \$50 each for the horror stories they told foreigners visiting the camps.'

And it's after visiting these camps in Thailand to collect such testimony that the United States and Canada went to the UN to make their violent attacks on Kampuchea.

One of the refugees who has



Peasant women in fields near Kompong Thom on Highway 6. Here and everywhere else the League delegation stopped to talk to people, there was no evidence of forced labour.

made the most noise here in Canada is Pin Yathay. Kampu-cheans living here have formally identified him as a ex-Lon Nol (head of the pupper government set up by the US in 1970) agent and member of a committee that had numerous patriots tortured under the Lon Nol regime. Somehow this engineer got his hands on enough money to make a world tour to spread his anti-communist propaganda.

POSITIVE EVIDENCE SUPPRESSED

Meanwhile dozens of positive reports from people who lived in Kampuchea have been carefully suppressed. These reports

deny that massive executions ever occurred.

Take the account of W.J. Sampson, published in the British magazine The Economist in March '77. Sampson worked as an economist for the Lon Nol government until March 1975. He quotes from a European friend who was in Phnom Penh when it was liberated and writes: "He saw and heard of no... executions apart from the shooting of some prominent politicians and the lynching of hated (American) bomber pilots.

As in any revolution, the people settled accounts with class enemies and traitors who had

shed the people's blood. But this was limited, according to the line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea which worked to unite all forces around the revolution.

Lastly, imperialism has ignored reports from numerous foreign delegations, including one from Japan, the Swedish ambassador, and Professor Rigaux, vice-president of the Belgian Human Rights League.

A WELL-ORCHESTRATED AND INTENTIONAL CAMPAIGN

If the massacres were simply invented, who did it and why?

It was the United States who launched this reactionary campaign, first and foremost to cover up their war crimes in Kampuchea. By crying "genothey hoped that people would forget their massacre and this one really happened -800,000 Kampucheans during the American war of aggression.

Another reason for the campaign was that socialist Kampuchea, where people in power threw out the Americans and kept them out, was a striking example for the other peoples of Southeast Asia. This threatened US interests. The Canadian bourgeoisie leapt whole-heartedly into the campaign of for the same reason and to defend its own economic ambi-

As for the USSR and Vietnam, who picked up the same lies and inflated them even more, their motives are now perfectly clear. For them it was a way to camouflage their barbaric invasion, passing it off as the "liberation" of Kampuches.

Three publications for the campaign in support of the Kampuchean people

SPEECH BY COMRADE POL.
POT, Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist
Party of Kampuches on the 18th
anniversary of the CPK.
Sum-up of the development of

Sum-up of the development of the party and the construction of socialism in Kampuchea (Sept. 1978) Red Flag Publications, 44p, \$0.75, available in English and

INTERVIEW WITH COMRADE POL POT, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Prime Minister of the government of Democratic Kampuchea given to a delegation of Yugoslav journalists visiting Kampuchea (March 1978) ches (March 1978)

Questions and answers about the history and accomplishments of socialist Kampuches and the lies spread by the cap

ritalists.
Red Flag Publications, 24p.
\$0.25, in English and French.

BLACK BOOK (Excerpts)


This unpublished dossier, given to the CCL(ML) delegation, connam's subversion, aggression and annexation of Kampuchea. Red Flag Publications, about 100p, published in two pam-phiets, \$1.50 for both

1951 Rosemont Blvd., Montreal (276-2421)

1068 College, Toronto (536-8749)

330 Carrall, Vancouver (681-4526)


Cambodia



gearly four years after going into self-imposed isolation, barring itself from normal international political and economic relations or even contacts, Cambodia is circumspectly and gradually opening itself to visitors. It is also looking for trade with a wider range of nations than the three or four with which it has had a minuscule exchange of rice and rubber for agricultural machinery and equipment for its small-scale industries. This unwrapping of what has been since its "liberation" an almost hermetically sealed communist state is strictly according to plan.

Cutting the country off from the global economy was a deliberate choice of the Angka (Organisation) as the Cambodian communist party is called. It went with the decision to send the new nation to the countryside, part of a development strategy to correct the distortions of the previous colonial economy and to restructure the country on the basis of its agriculture. The beginning of the end of economic and political isolation signals that the regime feels confident rice and other food production and the cultivation of raw materials for industry are now on a stable basis. The first phase of radical restructuring of the economy is almost over.

Cambodia has already exported 150,000 tons of rice. Three Yugoslav journaiists who together toured the country extensively and examined its development strategies reported in March 1978: "Judging by everything that we have seen in [Cambodia], that country has settled the problem of food supply for the population. In certain cooperatives ... the improvised warenouses could not house the new quantities of rice so that it had to be left in the fields." They also reported that a ton of rice, according to official information, was distributed among three persons annually. This, more or less, corresponded to a statement by Poi Pot that everybody is entitled to 312 kilograms of rice annually. The Yugoslav report also said: "We did not gain the impression that in the countryside ... there is a shortage of food. Without doubt, there is a sufficient supply of rice.



Cambodia became a French protectorate in 1864. Independence was declared in March 1945, when the Jacanese ended French power in Indochina, but after World War II the French returned. King Norodom Sihanouk, whom the French had placed on the throne in 1941, thereafter waged a campaign for complete independence. This was achieved in 1953. On March 2, 1955, believing he could lead his country more effectively from a less exited position, Sihanouk abdicated in favour of his father, King Norodom Suramarit (1893-1950).

Head of State Sihanoss was in Moscow in March 1970 when he was ousted in a bloodless coupled by Marshal Lon Nol.

Sihanouk left soon atterwards for Peking, which became his home. On May 5, 1970, he announced the formation of the Royal Government of National Union (GRUNK), under the auspices of the Stational United Front of Kampuches, with himself as Head of State.

The US-backed Lon Not government fell as GRUNK forces finally captured Planon Fenn on April 17, 1375. A new leftist government, headed by Khieu Samphan, was installed. The Secretary of the Communist Party of Kompuones, the formation of which was revealed in 1977, is Pol Pot.

and this country, rich in waters and canals, also has fish in abundance. The climate is so good that every crop must bear fruit. Consequently, regetable gardening is also in good supply."

A team of Japanese diplomats based in Poking and an economist attached to the mission visited Cambodia in August. The group has reported that it did not get the impression people were deprived of food. Supplies seemed to be adequate. Vegetables were abundant, with plenty of fruit, and the diet was supplemented by pig-breeding. The findings of the mission, are, of course, from a swift tour from Phnom Penh to Angker Wat. However, the economist, who had been in Cambodia in the time of the Lon Nol regime, found agriculture in better shape than before the liberation and irrigation much better organised than at that time. The Japanese mission presumed that the Pol Pot regime was stable.

Notwithstanding the fismay of observers outside Carphodia that the montry and out itself off from the manstream of the international community to regress to the "grasstoots radicalism" of an egalitation nat low-level passant economy, the planners in Phnom Penn apparently and not intend that the country should continue to be either isolated or primitively lackward.

Broadly, the development strategy which the commu-

nist regime has adopted is very similar to a scheme set out by Head of State Khieu Samphan in a doctoral dissertation he submitted when he was a student in Paris in the 1960s. It was widely studied by the Left in Phnom Penh. Khieu Samphan projected industrial development after agriculture had been consolidated. This objective is shared by the regime. Its broadcasts reflect the formative role that Khieu Samphan's thesis plays in the nation's new development strategy. Cambodian broadcasts persistently say that, far from a withdrawal to a traditional peasant society, "our

people do not seek to produce only rice, but also to produce goods for industrial use — cotton, rubber, textile fibres." In proceeding from agriculture to industrialisation, Khieu Samphan wrote, "Cambodia cannot delude itself on this point [that there is no limit to self-reliance and autonomous development] ... In the course of industrialisation it will need to import capital goods for a long time, perhaps indefinitely."

Khieu Samphan argued for autarchic development, which would be temporary but inescapable in the first phase of restructuring the economy. He attributed the nation's economic backwardness to its integration, under French colonial rule and that of the compradore class it bred, into the internationalist capitalist system "as a dependent, marginai element . . ." He said: "Increased trade within the structure of the world markets dominated by large capitalist countries and the aid that sometimes goes with it will never help Cambodia." Third World economies had been integrated into the world economies "chiefly to supply cheap labour for foreign capital." The accelerator effect of establishing industries in the "colonial countries" had not benefited the indigenous people, as it was claimed it would. Instead, the draining of profits to the investing country helped the growth of entrepreneurial activity there. Integration into the world economy had also left Cambodia with a two-tiered agricultural system - the foreign-owned large-scale plantations, and below these an impoverished rural agriculture in which 87% of the population was involved. So long as global links were maintained, Khieu Samphan argued, distortions and a steady de-

terioration of rural poverty would continue. Khieu Samphan's solution for breaking this pattern of growth for elites, both foreign and indigenous, and deepening poverty for the masses and widening disparities of wealth, was to "withdraw from the world economy, and restructure the local economy on a self-centred basis." Once agriculture and cottage industries had been placed on firm found-

ations. Cambodia would "re-enter the world economy on its own terms." There is accordingly a method to the seeming madness of Cambodia putting up its shutters against the world.

In 1978, as in the earlier years since the liberation, the emphasis has been primarily on agriculture and the development of small industries. Some of these industries serve agriculture by producing elementary farm tools and repair facilities, and others supply unsophisticated consumer needs.

National Profile

Land area: 181.035 sq. km. 16% cultivated, 74% forest, 3% pasture.

Total population: 8.2m (45% under 15).

Significant ethnic minorities: none.
Birth rate per 1,000: 47.
Death rate per 1,000: 13.
Life expectancy: 45 years.
Rate of growth per year (including immigration): (est.) 2.3%.

Infant mortality rate per 1,000: 150.
Students: NA.

Total workforce: 77 (est.) 2.6m.

Social and transport: Hospital beds per 1,000: NA. Doctors per 1,000: NA. TV receivers: NA. Radio receivers: NA. Telephones: NA. Motor vehicles: NA. Length of railways: 612km.
No. of locomotives: NA.

All money in USS. Dates refer to calendar year.

Domestic economy

GNP at market prices: 75 (est.) US\$591m.

Production indices: Manufacturing NA:
agriculture (1961-65=100) 74 43,
75 71, 76 81, 77 NA, 78 NA.

Merchandise imports: 74 US\$452m.

75 USS117m, 76 NA, 77 NA, 78 NA.

Merchandise exports: 74 USS15m. 75 USS17m, 76 NA, 77 NA, 78 NA.

Net capital flow (indicate + or -):
74 public +US\$305.8m,
private -US\$0.7m;
75 public +US\$79.7m,
private -US\$0.9m;
76 public +US\$0.6m.

76 public +USS0.6m. private +USS0.3m: 77 public NA, private NA; 78 public NA, private NA.

Balance of payments: NA. Foreign reserves: NA.

Outstanding foreign debt: NA.

The apparent achievements of Cambodian agriculture, especially in the cultivation of rice, may be attributed to its simple but highly productive building of irrigation dams, the improvement of dykes for more effective retention of water and the construction of reservoirs. While in most parts of Asia, agriculture is a gamble on the weather, the slogan in Cambodia is: "In farming rely on the people and not on the weather."

The Yugoslav journalists, as well as Chinese reporters, revealed a massive development of irrigation facilities. The Chinese who toured the country in April wrote that every region in Cambodia has built more than one reservoir with a capacity of 100-200 million cu. metres of water, due dozens of canals, each having a length of over 20 miles. Every province has medium-sized reservoirs. each storing 50-60 million cu. metres of water and every district has small reservoirs. The construction of these water-control projects has brought a third of the country's farmland under irrigation. In some areas, the Japanese mission revealed, there were two rice crops. The Yugoslavs said some of the new artificial lakes have about 200 million cu. metres of water.

In a review of development from April 1977-April 1975, the regime claimed that the quota set of 3 tens per hectare of rice for each crop was "almost completely fulfilled." With double-cropping in many areas output has been doubled to 6 tons per hectare annually. Many reservoirs with a capacity of 100 million cumetres and more have been built. The more notable of these was the Trapeang Thmar reservoir at Phnam Strok in Battambang province (capa-

city 200 million cu. metres), reportedly completed in one year. A dam has been built on the Streng Trabek in the eastern region of Cambodia, an area with few streams. In the central region, according to this review of premerativo dams have been built at Stoeng Ching and one each at Kompong Thuar and Kaoh Bo, on the border with Kompong Chang prevince. All the streams in Siem Reap pro-

Head of State: Khieu Samphan.

Prime Minister Pol Pot; Deputy Prime Ministers leng Sary (Foreign), Vorn Vet (Economy), Son Sen (Defence); Attorney-General NA; Minister of Propaganda and Information, Culture and Education Yun Yat; Public Health Thiounn Thioeunn; Social Action Mrs leng Thirith.

Premier Pot Pot (alias Saluth Sar) is married to Khieu Ponnary who is the sister of leng Thirith (Mrs leng Sary), the Minister of Social Action. Yun Yat is the wife of Defence Minister Son Sen.

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vince, Preah Net Preah, Battambang, Sisophon and Mong-kolborei districts have dams.

"Success in [Cambodian] agriculture stems from an extensive drive of large proportions in which the human physical effort exclusively formed the decisive factor," says Yugoslav journalist Slavko Stanic. "In effect this country, with the exception of motor pumps for soil irrigation, has at its disposal practically no other agricultural machinery." What has been accomplished is all the greater, Stanic remarks, if one takes into account the new reservoirs with a capacity of about 200 million cu. metres of water. These were built exclusively with human effort — as many as 20,000 engaged in a single project.

For agriculture (and its ancillary, irrigation), local labour, which includes a large number of women and children of school age, have been supplemented by mobile brigades, especially of youth. Japanese sources who visited Cambodia told the REVIEW: "It appeared that the leadership has extended to production in the post-liberation periods the guerilla war mentality." Indeed, a US State Department report on the Khmer Rouge wartime zone in Svay Rieng province acknowledges that these techniques of collectivist farming and cooperative labour had helped production outstrip previous individual efforts.

Quicker-yielding rice seeds have been introduced. Instead of the previous late maturing (five to eight months) varieties three- to four-month seeds are planted. The government claims that consequently two and even three crops, or more properly two and a half crops (the other half running into the next year), are now possible in some zones. However, most agricultural techniques are primitive.

The target in agriculture is modernising within the next 10-15 years. The objective is an annual yield of 8 tons per hectare. Modernising appears to be nationwide use of quicker-yielding rice seed. The movement, launched in 1977, has achieved some success in the southwest. Angkor Borei, it is claimed, has 30,000 hectares of modern rice fields. Planted with the three- to four-month variety of rice, each hectare yields an average 4 tons per crop. The programme has been extended to Veal Baray and Veal Santuk and to the region south of Kompong Thom and parts of Battambang province.

Premier Pol Pot has claimed that in 1978 the national plan for water conservancy construction has been "completed in the main." Dams, dykes and reservoirs constructed in 1978 have brought 300,000 more hectares of padi under irrigation in addition to the 400,000 hectares irrigated in 1977. A steel mill capable of supplying a quarter of the nation's requirements is under construction. The target set for the next 15-20 years, Pol Pot said, is the establishment of light industries, foodgrain processing, iron industry, machine-building and fuel, power and chemical industries.

INDUSTRIES

ambodia's textile industry received particular attention although the degree of development and its size are difficult to assess in conditions which exclude first-hand observation. Official reports claim that the "industry had developed rapidly" and that "some mills are now using a large number of automatic looms as in Moung District in the northwestern region." Official reports also claim the growth of carpentry shops that can produce various types of farm tools and looms, water-wheels, ricethreshers, winnowing machines, rice-huskers, rice-polishing mills run by water power, and spinning wheels. Other workshops that have rapidly developed manufacture natural fertiliser, soap, fish sauce, rubber soles, bricks and pottery. Since these industries are listed in a report on the revitalisation of cottage industries it may be presumed that they are very small workplaces, if they are anything more than family operations. Several metal workshops have been "transformed into fully-fledged industry." Previously they were cottage craft units. They produce farm tools, spare parts for various types of motors, motorised pumps, fertiliser-grinding machines, ploughshares, cooking pots, ventilators for motors and equipment "to meet the people's daily needs." The S'ang district textile mill in the southwestern region can now produce 160 metres of mosquito netting. 16-18 scarves and a "number of silk scarves a day." These statistics and the comment that "workers at the mill are also trying to repair old looms and are building 60 more new looms," together with the observation that "the textile workers in the district also help cooperatives in the ricegrowing drives" suggest that such units as survived the war of liberation are not yet fully restored and are working below capacity.

The Bor-3 plastic products factory near Chak Angre now turns out 9,000 metres of plastic sheet, 1,500 metres of rubber hose, 100 15-litre containers and 550 containers of larger dimensions, 500 bowls for latex, 650 drinking cups, 10 kgs of combs for weaving mills, 500 kgs of plastic bags, 100 thread rollers and 200 medicine containers and bottle caps. The reports do not indicate the period in which these products are turned out.

By day Phnom Penh is a ghost town of barely 20 inhabitants, besides its small forlorn colony of diplomats from seven countries. But the Japanese delegation which visited the capital, once overcrowded with 3 million, who were mostly refugees from the bombed countryside, said that by nightfall about 200,000 return to the houses in the city from outside. Pinnom Penh is only for sleeping in. Pol Pot told the Japanese mission that he hopes to increase the city's population to 400,000. There are no shore there. The Friendship Store is open three times a week for foreigners. The people's clothing is poor, but they are not undernourished. Pol Pot also indicated he would be establishing new factories around Phnom Penh. The industries now operating outside the city make cigarettes, lathes, blankets, cotton dyed goods, nuts and bolts, water pumps and pharmaceuticals.

Takeo provincial town has been turned into an industrial centre. Two factories — for farm tools and utility textiles — are housed in Takeo college. Discarded machines (from the war) are being utilised for farm tools and machines. A land transport corps in the Phnom Penh sector is making nuts and bolts and spare parts for many types of car. The manufactures include sparking plugs, pistons, compressors, pumps and items necessary for transport equipment. Small cargo boats of 70-500 tons capacity are also being built.

HEALTH AND EDUCATION

remier Pol Pot claims that by the beginning of 1978 80-90% of malaria had been contained and eliminated. The masses and the army were deployed on antimalaria measures. There is an extensive first aid system of public health throughout the country. On the curative size the health services depend on a small number of doctors and the use of pharmaceuticals made of local herbs and other domestic raw material, which, presumably, are in the pharmacopoeia of traditional systems of medicine. The regime says: "Doctors and medical workers can independently repair and operate semi-automatic and automatic captule-sealing machines. The revolutionary doctors seek formulae

for the making of various types of pills using mainly local raw materials. They breed microbes, germinate microorganisms, analyse the sources of disease and devise drugs to fight diseases such as plague, cholera and smallpox."

These are obviously exaggerated claims. Colonial France did not leave behind in Cambodia anything more than a rudimentary medical service, and the government of Prince Sihanouk had spent barely 2% of the nation's budget on health. However, in the Khmer Rouge zone during the war of liberation there did exist a competent medical system organised under the direction of Dr Thiounm Thioeun, once dean of the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Phnom Penh. This zone was believed to have had at least 25 doctors who had left Lon Nol's territory to work with the resistance. In 1972 the Khmer Rouge had so organised its medical system that it had one or more hospitals in every province under its authority, with a fully trained doctor for each district, a medical committee for each village and two male nurses with three years' training for each hamlet. In the circumstances, the Pol Pot regime's claim that "a sanitation network has been established in all cooperative bases throughout the country" could well be valid. It implies that the structures that existed in the liberated zones have been extended to the rest of the country. Through improved medical care the population from 1977 to mid-1978 had increased by 392,000. The total population by mid-1978 was 7.8 million.

Pol Pot claimed in his interview with the Yugoslav journalists: "The whole population has learned to read and write. This was what the former society had never been able to achieve, and these are the outstanding successes of the new [Cambodia]." The official report of progress from April 1977-April 1978 says that it is compulsory to learn the alphabet, mathematics, science and technology. Learning to read is a regular feature at all departments and ministries.

Pol Pot has acknowledged that there are no longer any universities or higher technological schools. Technicians for industry and agriculture "learn by doing," acquiring their technological education from concrete experience. This system may be suitable for the current low level economy, but as Cambodia proceeds from its primitive agriculture to a sophisticated cultivation system and towards industrialisation, it will have to rely on "friendly countries" for expertise and the training of cadres.

SOCIAL ORGANISATION

basis of administration. Since transport and communications have not recovered from the ravages of war and its earlier underdevelopment in the countryside as distinct from the facilities that existed in the pre-liberation urban centres, the cooperative is an all-purpose unit, also used for the transmission of directives from the party centre to the periphery for implementation.

The Yugoslav journalists' report says that the cooperative consists of a chairman and several committees. A thousand families may be grouped in them, with roughly five to a family. One cooperative had 10,000 members. The structure has, as most institutions in the new Cambodia, been extended to all of the country from the previous zones held by the Khmer Rruge. The land is held and cultivated collectively. The investock, too, belongs to the cooperative. But each family is allowed to retain a homestead next to its house, where it may grow vegetables or rear hens and geese.

Major decisions are made by all cooperative members. But the cultivation of crops is according to directives issued from the centre. Below the party centre, the decisive administrative unit is the cooperatives' committee, each of



about seven members, transmitting suggestions to the party centre and government organisations and communicating directives from Phnom Penh to the cooperative members.

Work is divided. The cooking for the cooperative families is assigned to one group and the food eaten by all in public restaurants run by the cooperatives as it was in the kibbutzim in the early days of Israel. The field and industrial workers are broken up into work brigades. Unlike the Chinese communes, where remuneration is according to work points gained, in the Cam-

bodia cooperative, and in the country for that matter, there is no money. The Yugoslav team reported: "Complete equalisation exists: every cooperative member gets from the state one black linen suit each year." The rice ration (312 kgs each year) comes from the cooperative. So does the ration of salt. Exchange of goods occurs between cooperatives on the basis of prices fixed by the state, but this is strictly a bookkeeping operation — no money is involved.

Although Cambodians claim they are building a collectivist system, Pol Pot says there is no model that is being followed. Its system is unique. Improvisations are made in response to emerging new situations. The blueprint that is being so adjusted, obviously, is the Khieu Samphan plan.

THE WAR

ndoubtedly, the war with Vietnam was the most obsessive issue for the Cambodian regime in 1978. For its origins, each side blames the other charging "the enemy" initiated excursions into its territory across imprecisely defined borders. The Vietnamese allege territorial expansion and irredentist claims as the Cambodian motive for "aggression." The Cambodians attribute it to Hanoi's ambition for regional hegemony for which an Indochinese federation of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos is a necessary first step. Some observers argue that Hanoi needs territory on the other side of its boundary with Cambodia so that it can more effectively control the turbulent south. Hanoi used the Ho Chi Minh trail which cut through Cambodia during the Vietnam war to supply and reinforce the anti-US resistance in South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese expect the regime of Pol Pot to be overthrow by Cambodians resisting his "tyrannical" rule. Hanoi speaks of rebel Cambodian forces that have already seized slices of territory. Cambodian sources acknowledged to the REVIEW that the Vietnamese had had their agents within the Cambodian communist party. These had been eliminated. Pro-Vietnamese elements from among Cambodians who had been bought over had been planted especially in the eastern provinces and in the Parrot's Beak region. These "tratorous" elements were used not only since December last year, when the war between Cambodia and Vietnam broke into the open, but also during the struggle against the Lon No! regime and the US. These had been planted in every organ of the Cambodian party and unit. "The North Vietnamese who had used [Cambodia] as the rear base and a refuge during the war against the US had even then tried

Many outside observers agree with the Canadian Government which said in a letter to the UN secretary-general that,

based on intensive interviews with Cambodian refugees,

their testimony points to the "unavoidable conclusion that

gross and persistent violations of human rights have occurred in Democratic Kampuchea since mid-1975 . . . in a man-

ner contrary to both the spirit and letter of the universal

declaration of human rights." Against these and other similar charges by the US and

Britain, Cambodia's chief international spokesman, Deputy

Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs leng Sary, said that such criticism was merely false propaganda generated to divide

the Kampuchean people. In a telegram addressed to the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in October, the

Phnom Penh Government said it would "make mincemeat

of any criminal attempt to investigate" the internal situation in Democratic Kampuchea. Undoubtedly under Chinese persuasion, if not pressure,

the world's loneliest state later asked UN Secretary-General

Kurt Waldheim to "come in and see" if there have been violations of human rights. Reports from refugees of tor-

ture, prison camps, and the brutal extermination of oppo-

nents, had made Cambodia "an untouchable" to many in

the international community. Even if Waldheim would not have been able to observe much in a brief visit, the invita-

tion implied confidence in the Cambodian regime that it could stand up to scrutiny.

In the meantime US and other Western opinion is shift-

ing from an emphasis on alleged atrocities in Cambodia to the view that it is a "domino" to be saved from Vietnam.

The Phnom Penh Government inevitably invites contradictions in comparing what it says about life in Cambodia today with what its critics, including over 25,000 refugees

reaching Thailand and another 150,000 in Vietnam, say. One diplomatic analyst says: "Students of Cambodia have

to be schizophrenic, because you're constantly seeing two

different pictures, looking at the same country."

To give an alternative picture, the following section is purposely compiled from unofficial sources —

refugees, radio intercepts, intelligence officers, etc. - Editor 164

to control the people's movement in [Cambodia], in a planned way," according to an authoritative Cambodian source.

"During the five years of our war with the Lon Nol clique, the Vietnamese had planted some of their members in our leading organs in a planned way," he said. "The agents were [Cambodians]. Vietnam tried to force our party to toe the Ho Chi Minh line. We carried out an independent line. The Ho Chi Minh line was for one party, one country and one people - in fact, the Indochinese federation, which we could not accept," the source said. Some of the Cambodians along the borders - at the regional and local levels

- might be pro-Vietnamese, the source said. The most intensive activity of the Vietnamese for a coup against the present Cambodian leadership was at the end of May 1978, according to this view, when the Vietnamese sent as agents of subversion a member of their party central committee and a former counsellor in the Vietnamese Embassy in Phnom Penh. These two hoped, with some assistants sent inside Cambodia, to carry out a coup. Such coup bids were not new: similar attempts had been made by Vietnam in 1966 and 1967 but these efforts to subvert

the Cambodian party had failed. Essentially, the Cambodian malcontents are not pro-Vietnamese, the source said, but people who have been bought over. "There are such elements in our party, but we



leng Sary and China's maa in Malaysia.

have not announced who they are. When the Vietnamese invaded the eastern territories some of these elements helped them come in."

After following an isolationist foreign policy there is now a slow movement towards the internationcommunity. In 1978 relations with Malaysia were developed, with the consciousness that of all the Asean capitals,

Kuala Lumpur seeined to be the least unsympathetic to the Indochina states. Unlike Vietnam and Laos, Cambodia has not attacked Asean. Undoubtedly the most persuasive argument for cordiality towards its Asean neighbours is the hostility to Phnom Penh of Haroi. Peking, too, may discreetly be inducing the Cambodians to open their door. Of the several

espite Cambodia's claim that it won a major victory on January 6, one just as glorious as the April 17, 1975 victory over the US-supported regime of former dictator Lon Nol, senior intelligence sources say that Vietnam's decision to pull back its forces into enclaves just inside the Cambodian border was prompted rather by a cryptic communication from Peking to Hanoi: pull back or

face a major confrontation with China. The border war was the most spectacular development in 1978 and the influence it had on Cambodian politics was strong yet indirect. The overriding concern in Phnom Penh was the fight by Pol Pot and his closest supporters to stay in power. It was estimated that 80% of the regime's time and effort was spent on keeping itself entrenched in the face of what the Thais and others said were three or four attempts to topple the current leadership within the past

Insurrections were said to have taken place in three regions: in the northwest long a hard-to-control area where the overwhelming majority of refugees in Thailand have come from: in the southeast, isolated from Phnom Penli by the Cardamon mountains, where a Comrade Veun runs a virtual fiefdom; and in Military Region 203 along the Vietnamese border in Kompong Cham province. In late summer, a Cambodian army unit - battalion or company-sized - mutinied under the direction of former senior Khmer Rouge leader So Phim. Some said the unit was destroyed by troops loyal to Phnom Penh, others that the dissident soldiers have since been welcomed into the Cambodian insurgent movement supported by the Vietnamese army. The insurgency is paramilitary, carrying out operations in support of the Vietnamese army which has been able to occupy up to 20 kms of Cambodian territory in mainly Svay Rieng and

Kompong Cham provinces. On Phnom Penh radio Pol Pot said: "There is both unity and contradiction but the unity is overwhelming as more than 99% of our people support [us] ... only a small handful of recalcitrent enemy assents oppose the . . . revolution ... and they have been isolated ... the great collective masses are in control of these agents at all times." Various official estimates by leng Sary and others have given the figure of between 80,000-100,000 so-called enemy agents.

Despite international outrage, the Pol Pot government continues to defy those who predict its imminent collapse.

visits paid by Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister leng Sary to Cambodia's neighbours, the most significant were those to Thailand.

However despite the cordiality of the exchanges between Sary and Thai Premier Kriangsak Chamanand in early September 1978, the public record shows only a relaxation of tensions. Cambodia, for its part, is not joining any regional organisations — not even the Mekong committee which promises massive benefits for the region through the management of the river. Cambodia seems to be content to mind its own business.

TRADE

visit by a trade delegation from Singapore, a traditional trading partner, was one of the major moves in 1978 in the slow journey back from self-imposed economic isolation. However, the trek back began with modest trading with Hongkong in 1976. In 1977 there were links with Japan too. In 1977 imports from these three — Singapore, Hongkong and Japan — were a meagre USS19 million, but a great leap for Cambodia from the USS2.5

million of 1976. Exports to the three countries shot up t US\$680,000 in 1977 from US\$357,000 in 1976. The trad with Hongkong is operated by Ren Fung Co., an organisation of Cambodian nationals.

Hongkong, its largest trading partner (USS90,600 is 1977 in imports from Cambodia) takes vegetable fibres an a small quantity of rubber. Phnom Penh's purchases from Hongkong in 1976 were largely textile yarn, pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles and spares, machinery and DDT. It 1977 more motor vehicles and machinery were bough from Hongkong than before, along with petroleum products, textiles and other industrial raw materials.

The perplexing question about Cambodia since the lib eration is the cost in human lives of its process of revolutionary change. Reports from refugees and Hanoi's vitriolia accusations allege at least 2 million were killed. The Cambodians ridicule these as "black propaganda" and fantasie of their enemies. Undoubtedly, the enemies of the realn have been punished. Cambodian sources say there are two forms of trial. One is by the state "after the evidence habeen examined." The other is by the people. The number is small and the nature of the punishment would "depend on the crime." The truth of charge and denial may be determined only after Cambodia becomes less inaccessible that it is now to independent, objective scrutiny.

From "Kampuchea Today":

5. Why Phnom Penh was evacuated

In the spring of 1975, Phnom Penh was a city swollen, choked and starved by war. Among its 3.1 million inhabitants were 2.5 million people who had crowded into the city between 1970 and 1975. They were refugees from the U.S. war of aggression that had left their villages bombed out and their ricefields defoliated.

This article is the story of how and why Phnom Penh was evacuated after the victorious Revolutionary Army entered its streets on April 17, 1975. The story was told to us by many people we met in Kampuchea, including Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary as well as workers and peasants who participated in the evacuation.

Many lies and slanders about the event have appeared in the Western press. This is the first time that the truth about it is being told in an American newspaper.

In January of 1975, the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) had given the directive to all units of the Revolutionary Army to launch the Mekong River offensive. By February, it had become clear that it was only a matter of time before the U.S.-Lon Nol forces would be completely isolated and victory in the liberation war would belong to the Kampuchean people.

It was at this time that the CPK Central Committee first turned its attention to what the liberation forces would do once they entered

Phnom Penh. They knew that even if the Lon Nol puppet troops surrendered, many dangers to the revolution would still exist.

During the five years of war, both the CIA and the KGB had developed extensive counter-revolutionary networks of agents and spies in Phnom Penh. The Lon Nol clique had built all sorts of secret communications systems and underground arms depots. Various other foreign powers, including most of Kampuchea's neighbors, had their agents in place in the Kampuchean capital.

These reactionary forces were dead-set against the revolution and would do their best to sabotage it from within once it achieved victory. Knowing this, the CPK leadership began to make plans. Figuring prominently in these plans was the idea of a total evacuation of Phnom Penh.

By removing the whole population to the countryside—including the thousands of spies and agents—the counter-revolutionary networks would be destroyed. Their plans for using Phnom Penh to stage a coup d'etat would be foiled. As for the counter-revolutionaries themselves, they could be given a chance to mend their ways in the countryside under the close supervision of the peasants.

At first, the need for the evacuation may sound far-fetched. But actually, it was a brilliant tactic that enabled the new-born revolution to survive.

Consider this: Sirik Matak and Long Boret, two of Lon Nol's inner circle, were waiting for the Revolutionary Army at the Foreign Ministry in Phnom Penh on April 17. Even though the Kampuchean people had long since marked these two traitors, as well as five others, for certain execution, Sirik Matak and Long Boret chose not to flee the country as Lon Nol had. Why did they stay on?

They were instructed by their U.S. masters to remain behind to direct counter-revolutionary activities after liberation. Sirik Matak and Long Boret figured that the Revolutionary Army would be so overwhelmed by the tasks of administering Phnom Penh, that the CPK would be forced to establish a coalition government with them.

Buying time in this way, Sirik Matak and Long Boret would put their reactionary agents to work and eventually stage a counter-revolution. We were told that captured documents detailed concrete plans for how this would be brought about.

IMPERIALISTS' PLOTS FOILED

These documents indicated that while the U.S. nominally abandoned Kampuchea on April 12, the real thinking of the imperialists was to withdraw only temporarily. CIA intelligence estimated that the Revolutionary Army—most of whose troops had never been inside Phnom Penh in their lives—would not be able to hold power in the city. Either through aid to a Sirik Matak-Long Boret "uprising" or through a new U.S. bombing offensive against Phnom Penh, the CIA felt sure that the new government could be quickly destabilized and overthrown.

Neither the CIA nor any of the other foreign agents that hoped to stage a counter-revolution ever dreamed that Phnom Penh would be evacuated and their plots foiled in this way. "We always had to be one step ahead of the enemy," a CPK member told us, referring to the evacuation plan.

Although the security question was clearly one of the main factors in the evacuation decision, it was not the only one. The food problem was also a major consideration.

Inside Phnom Penh at the time of liberation, starvation was already rampant. Three hundred people, in fact, starved to death each day.

The entire rice supply of the city had been depleted. The fields immediately around Phnom Penh had all been defoliated. The roads leading into the countryside were bombed out and impassable. By April, it was only the U.S. airlift that was keeping the regime alive.

The CPK knew that the people would turn against the revolution if it couldn't feed them, and they also knew that the U.S. was counting heavily on exactly that.

Again, the evacuation of the city held the key to the problem. In the countryside, a thriving cooperative agricultural system existed, having

been established in the liberated zones in 1973. If the people of Phnom Penh were dispersed to these cooperatives, the peasants would be able to share their food with them. If this wasn't done, famine would spread

like wildfire in the capital city.

On top of the security issue and the food problem, the CPK leaders also recognized that there would be some important political benefits from the evacuation. It would serve to break down class distinctions and the sharp divisions that existed between the peasants and the city dwellers. It would also enable the whole population to be mobilized for the vast tasks of national reconstruction that lay in the countryside.

For all these reasons, the decision to evacuate Phnom Penh was implemented. Party cadres went block-to-block informing the people about the evacuation, and within 10 days the city was almost entirely

empty.

As part of the U.S. imperialists' propaganda war against Kampuchea, the evacuation of Phnom Penh has been portrayed in the American press as a "forced march," where the whole population of the city was sent to the countryside at gunpoint, and the old and sick were left to die.

EVACUATION, NOT FORCED MARCH

But this is a lie. One Party cadre who helped organize the evacuation told us, "If we used force to carry out the evacuation, then the people would have rebelled against us. In fact, the masses supported the evacuation, because they saw that without it the revolution would not survive. Many people just went on their own, back to their native place.

"The task of the Party cadres along the route," he continued, "was not to point guns at anyone, but to make sure that food was distributed, that the old and sick could ride in whatever cars were available, and that the cooperatives in the countryside were as well-prepared as possible to

take in the city dwellers."

Of course, there was some scattered opposition to the evacuation, mainly by the reactionaries and the agents of foreign powers. We were told of CIA and KGB agents who hid in the basements of various buildings for up to a month after the evacuation, finally surrendering when they ran out of food. In many cases, the liberation forces found that these reactionaries had stockpiles of arms and equipment in their hiding places.

With elements like this involved, it's not hard to imagine that some measure of force had to be used by the new government to carry out the evacuation. But in the main, the people were won to support it through political persuasion. For whatever hardships the evacuation entailed—and there is no doubt that it entailed food shortages, lack of medical facilities, and physical exhaustion for many people—the revolution

triumphed as a result.

Now, three years later, the shanties, shacks and general filth of Phnom Penh have been cleaned up. Slowly but surely the city is being repopulated in accordance with the plan for industrial development.

Looking back on the evacuation of Phnom Penh, we can see that under the concrete conditions of the Kampuchean revolution, it proved to be the correct solution to the problems faced by the new government. It was much more than a march of three million people into the countryside. It was actually a vast political movement that enabled socialism to succeed in Kampuchea.

SPEECH TO SECURITY COUNCIL

by

Prince NORODOM SIHANOUK (Democratic Kampuchea)

January 11, 1979.

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The Council

As indeed the whole world knows, my country is the victim of a large-scale act of flagrant aggression by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, a country which had described itself as our "brother,", our "faithful companion in arms in the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle", a country which had asserted that it was a "socialist country which had asserted that it was a "socialist country ing, as does Cambodia, to the camp of the non-a igned States".

In the not too distant past or, more precisely, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the principal deaders of the party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and those of the National Liberation Front and the Provisional Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam, in particular Le Duan, First Sacretary of the Vietnamese Communist party, Pham Van Bong, Prime Minister of the Republic of Viet Nam, Yo Nguyen Giap, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Nguyen Muu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat, respectively Head of State and Head of Government of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam, have never ceased to state, to affirm, to reaffirm and even to write to Norodom Sihanouk, then Head of State of Cambodia or Kampuchea, that "now as in the future and to the very end of time" their socialist Viet Nam, their revolutionary Viet Nam, their anti-colonialist, anti-marticular and to be their sacred duty scrupulously and unswervingly to respect the independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of "fraternal" Kampuchea.

But, on the very morrow of the final victory, in April 1975 - a victory over imperialism - and in the wake of the reunification of the two Viet Name, North and South, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam decided, cold-bloodedly, to

SPEECH TO SECURITY COUNCIL

by by

Prince NORODOM SIHANOUK (Democratic Kampuchea)

January 11, 1979

Firstly may I be permitted to thank the members of the Council most sincerely for the genuine sympathy they have extended to the people of Democratic Kampuchea. As a result of that sympathy, today I have been granted the honour of coming here to give them an objective account of the Kampuchean problem, or, rather, the current Kampuchean-Vietnamese problem.

As indeed the whole world knows, my country is the victim of a large-scale act of flagrant aggression by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, a country which had described itself as our "brother,", our "faithful companion in arms in the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle", a country which had asserted that it was a "socialist comrade", "belonging, as does Cambodia, to the camp of the non-aligned States".

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Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and Commanderin-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat, respectively Head of State and Head of Government of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam, have never ceased to state, to affirm, to reaffirm and even to write to Norodom Sihanouk, then Head of State of Cambodia or Kampuchea, that "now as in the future and to the very end of time" their socialist Viet Nam, their revolutionary Viet Nam, their anti-colonialist, antiimperialist, anti-war Viet Nam held it to be and would continue to hold it to be their sacred duty scrupulously and unswervingly to respect the independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of "fraternal" Kampuchea.

But, on the very morrow of the final victory, in April 1975 - a victory over imperialism - and in the wake of the reunification of the two Viet Nams, North and South, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam decided, cold-bloodedly, to

embark upon a very special "operation" the ultimate goal of which was nothing less than to swallow up "little" Kampuchea just as a starving boa constrictor would fling itself upon an innocent animal.

Starving - that certainly is and has been an apt description of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. All the newpapers, all television and radio networks in all the count of the world, with the exception of course of the countries closely linked to the USSR and the USSR itself, have stressed and continue to stress repeatedly that the Socialist Republic Viet Nam, ever since its victory at the end of April, 1975, he been sinking ever deeper - and with what desperation - into the abyss of economic and financial failure without any possibility of recovery, its agriculture, which had been very prosperous the south of the country during the period of French colonial on the verge of collapse; its industrialization marked by disorderly planning and a surprising confusion and its administration, to say the least, becoming ever more corrupt.

In the circumstances, a Democratic Kampuchea in full economic upswing, possessing vast rice paddies ever more admirably and fully irrigated and innumerable fields where fruit trees, maize, sugar-cane, all kinds of vegetables and other crops grow in great profusion, not to mention the wealth that lies in its subsoil and the harmonious expansion of its industrialization, could not but arouse envy in our great neighbour where an age-old tradition - a tradition held in high esteem by all the successive Vietnamese regimes so far - was prompting it to undertake the highly profitable colonization of Kampuche

My saying what I have just said about Viet Nam does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of that country; there is a necessity which makes it my duty to create a better understanding of the reasons why my country has always had to put up with acts of aggression and other armed attacks from Viet Nam, which have been going on since the fifteenth century.

From the fifteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century, Viet Nam, in spite of the bitter and indomitable resistance of the army and the people of Kampuchea, succeeded it swallowing up a good half of Kampuchea. That half became what is known today as "South Viet Nam"; it used to be the south of Kampuchea.

Although this is inconceivable in the 1970s, when al the talk is of respect for the United Nations Charter and the just principles of non-alignment, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, a Member moreover of the United Nations and a fullfledged member of the "family" of the non-aligned countries, i not embarrassed by any scruples. Greatly encouraged by its multifarious alliances, in particular a <u>de facto</u> military alliance with the USSR, one of the two world super-Powers, drawing comfort from the total and unconditional support accorded it by the Powers of the Warsaw Pact, with the exception of Romania, respecting the "good" old traditions of shamelessly swallowing up small neighbours whenever the opportunity presented itself, and motivated also, we must point out, by the keen appetite that it had nurtured for many years, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam came to the point of launching an all-out attack with all the power of its Hitlerite armed forces for the conquest of Kampuchea.

The irresistible advance of a host of armoured tanks and cars, accompanied by a dozen infantry divisions supported by the most modern heavy artillery, preceded and protected by innumerable aircraft of all types, including MIG-21s and some MIG-23s; that advance, a veritable German-style blitzkrieg in nature, strangely reminds us of the onslaught of the Hitlerite armed forces to which so many European countries - France and Poland in particular - fell victim at the beginning of the Second World War.

All this shows how monstrous and dastardly is the current conquest of my poor little country by the big neighbour whose numerical superiority is compounded by a formidable military outfit, equipped to the teeth as it is by one of the two most formidable military Powers in the world today.

National United Front for National Salvation

I wish now to say something about the so-called National United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea and its so-called government.

The Government, press and radio of Hanoi themselves have very spontaneously been declaring to the world at large that this Front was created and existed only since the date of 2 December, 1978. I repeat 2 December, 1978.

Now the formidable Guderian or Rommel-style blitzkrieg which was launched by the so-called Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea was unleashed against us on 25 December, 1978. I repeat, 25 December 1978.

Even schoolchildren at the primary level would be unable to believe that in the extremely short space of only 22 days, this tiny and insignificant so-called Kampuchean Front could recruit, equip, teach, train and lick into shape such an Olympian armed force of so many components and furthermore equipped with machines and weapons requiring a perfect mastery of electronics and ballistics, not to mention the special skills that can be possessed only by units which have already taken part in large-scale operations.

In the face of the insolent claim on the part of th Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the effect that the war that is raging in Kampuchea or Cambodia is only a civil war without any Vietnamese involvement, the Kampuchean people, through me has the honour of asserting vigorously that this war is purely a war of aggression, annexation, colonialization and regional hegemonism unilaterally, arbitrarily and unjustly unleashed by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam against little Kampuchea.

The so-called Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation and its "government" are, in fact, only a pitiful smokescreen designed to hide from the outside world the criminal and repugnant anti-Kampuchean undertaking of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, which shows its contempt of other sovereign countries and peoples of the world by feeding them such obvious lies that even a child cannot give them any credence.

Those countries which have hastened to accord de jure recognition to the "government" of Heng Samrin, the pitiful pur pet of the Vietnamese, expose themselves as the intimate accomplices that they are of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam in its current attempt to annihilate independent, sovereign, neutrand non-aligned Kampuchea.

The States and the mass media which prize justice, freedom and moral and political probity have in recent days made a point of clearly denouncing the deep-dyed deceit of Viet Name and of inviting the whole world to exercise pressure on it to make it give up its criminal enterprise right away, thus making it possible, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter, for Democratic Kampuchea and the Kampuchean people to recover their independence and national territorial integrity.

If by chance there is any problem dividing the Kampucheans, this problem must and should be resolved by Kampucheans alone without any interference from outside countries.

I should like to present to the Council certain governmental statements from countries that love justice, independence and peace which show, first, that the so-called National United Front for National Salvation of Kampuchea and its "government" are only puppets of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; secondly that Democratic Kampuchea is clearly the victim of a flagrant act of aggression and invasion, which is the work of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; and, thirdly, that the criminal Vietnamese enterprise must be categorically condemned and everything possible done to induce Viet Nam to evacuate all its armed and other forces from Kampuchea.

The Permanent Representative of the United States, Mr. Andrew Young, said:

"It would be most cynical for us to allow
Governments to be striken from the rolls simply
because another Power moves in and says it no
longer exists. I would be reluctant, if I were
the Soviet Union and Viet Nam, to admit that the
Government no longer exists, because it would
seem as though they knew too much about it to
be innocent of it."

Mr. Hodding Carter, a United States State Department spokesman, stated:

"Yes, Viet Nam, through its invasion of Kampuchea, is guilty of invasion. They [the Vietnamese] have violated the territorial integrity of Kampuchea. What we clearly want is the withdrawal of foreign intervention."

His Excellency Mr. Sonoda, Foreign Minister of Japan, said:

"The Japanese Government will call for the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea."

His Excellence the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, Shaikh Jaber Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, declared:

"We informed the Soviet Ambassador that we are opposed to any aggression against the sover-eignty and freedom of a small nation. We hold that every Member of the United Nations has the right to call for a Security Council session as it thinks necessary. We support Kampuchea's demand. She has been subjected to an aggression which needs to be discussed in the Security Council. Such an aggression implies a threat to the security and territorial integrity of a sovereign State."

His Excellency Mr. Hans Blix, Foreign Minister of Sweden, said:

"Foreign intervention in Kampuchea is a threat to the interests of all small countries. The Swedish Government is opposed to foreign military intervention in Kampuchea, considering it a violation of the United Nations Charter." His Excellency Mr. Diego Uribe Vargas, Foreign Minister of Colombia, stated:

"Any menace to peace, no matter what it is, is an event which causes preoccupation among peoples. I believe that the United Nations should act immediately."

His Excellency Mr. Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister of Australia, declared:

"The Vietnamese invasion has created risk of serious intensification of the war into a regional conflict which would have serious consequences for all who live in the region. The very fact that Viet Nam has signed an agreement that contains security elements with the Soviet Union tends to introduce the Eastern-bloc approach to politics in South-East Asia."

According to the official daily newspaper of the Romanian Communist Party, Scinteia, Romania condemns:

"the support given [by Viet Nam] to elements which have risen against the authorities of their own country. There can be no arguments to justify intervention and interference in the affairs of another State, whatever form they may take."

Mr. Cedomir Vuchovic, commentator of the State Radio of Yugoslavia, has said:

"Every people, including the people of Cambodia, has the right to decide on its own what system it will build. It is quite another question whether this system pleases or does not please someone outside."

Internal Situation

I wish now to describe to members very briefly the situation now prevailing in my country, Democratic Kampuchea.

The Vietnamese enemy has occupied Phnom Penh, our capital, most of our cities, and part of our countryside.

The Government and army of Democratic Kampuchea, the only legal State of Kampuchea, are respectively administering and defending our country in the unoccupied zone, which contains a small number of towns near the Kampuchean-Thai border, as well as part of the national territory.

The leaders of Democratic Kampuchea are still in our country; the seat of our Government is in one of our mountains. Our Government, our army, our people, are fighting and will fight to the death against the Vietnamese expansionist and colonialist invader.

We shall never surrender. We may lose everything, but we will never lose our national honour.

Before concluding my statement, I wish to point out to His Excellency, the head of the Soviet delegation, which is so hostile to mine, that the fact that the legal government of a given country has lost a battle to an enemy Power having overwhelming superiority in arms and that it has had to yield temporary control over the capital of that country does not mean that the legal Government in question becomes, ipso facto, illegal and that it has to be replaced in the United Nations by a puppet regime put together by the foreign occupier. In 1940, General de Gaulle, the true symbol of France, had to retreat to London following the temporary loss of the French capital, Paris, to the Hitlerite invaders.

The Soviet Union

In his statement just now in favour of the Kampuchean traitors in the pay of the Vietnamese conquerors His Excellency the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics seemed to care more about Kampuchea than the Kampucheans themselves - which cannot fail to be surprising.

In response to this surprising pretension, permit me to recall that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the bad habit of remaining in Phnom Penh with Kampuchean traitors. Between 1970 and 1975, instead of standing shoulder to shoulder with the Kampuchean patriots who were fighting against imperialism and the clique of the traitor Lon Nol, the Soviet Embassy made a particular point of collaborating and co-operating with the reactionary Lon Nol group, fascists and war criminals though they were. The same applied to Czechoslovakia, whose present regime gladly allowed Russian tanks in 1968 to crush Czechoslovak patriots.

I shall say nothing more about that right now.

In conclusion, we should like to express to the Council our deep gratitude and our confidence, and we sincerely hope that in its forthcoming resolution it will for the sake of justice and peace in the world, firstly, condemn the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, which has without any justification committed aggression and invaded and colonized Democratic Kampuchea; secondly, ensure that there is no de jure or even de facto

recognition of the so-called new State of Kampuchea; thirdly, demand that the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam put an immediate end to its aggression and withdraw totally, unconditionally and immediately all its armed forces and all its military and civilian components from the territory of Kampuchea; fourthly, call on all the specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations connected with the United Nations and all Governments throughout the world to cease and refuse any financial, economic, military, material or other aid to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and its puppets, in order to prevail upon Viet Nam to give up its brutal treatment of Kampuchea and its threatening of other countries of South-East Asia and stability and peace in Asia throughout the world; and, fifthly, in the event of Viet Nam's continuing its totally unjustified aggression and maltreatment of Kampuchea, reconvene in order to take further appropriate of Kampuchea, reconvene in order to take further appropriate measures to prevail upon Viet Nam to respect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and peace of Kampuchea, in keeping with the spirit and letter of the United Nation Charter

From the bottom of my heart I thank the members of the Council for their concern for me.

the reactionary Lon Nol group, fascists and war criminals

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Statement dated 11 January 1979 by the Government of Democratic Kampuchea concerning the barbarous Vietnamese aggression

The Vietnamese enemy aggressors, annexationists, swallowers of the territory of Kampuchea and exterminators of the Kampuchean nation, after mobilizing huge forces, including many tanks, pieces of heavy artillery and aircraft of all kinds, such as MIG-19s, 21s and 23s, have launched a large-scale aggression and invasion against Democratic Kampuchea, causing immense devastation to the people of Kampuchea and temporarily occupied a number of towns and the capital city of Phnom Penh. Concerning this situation, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea has the following statement to make:

The frenzied aggression and invasion by the Vietnamese aggressors, supported by their master, the Soviet Union, are most criminal acts perpetrated for the purpose of exterminating the nation and people of Kampuchea. This situation may well cause temporary difficulties for the Kampuchean people. But the heroic Kampuchean people and the heroic Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea have put up a heroic resistance, as standard-bearers of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of glorious Democratic Kampuchea, and of the honour and dignity of the nation and people of Kampuchea. They are determined to fight the Vietnamese enemy aggressors and their masters and are imbued with an implacable hatred and with a most sublime revolutionary heroism.

This struggle is spreading throughout the country with an intensity surpassing even that witnessed at the beginning of the five-year war. Armed with this heroism, our entire people and our Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea as a whole are determined to unite to a man, to overcome all difficulties, to continue to wage the people's war in conformity with the statement made by Prime Minister Pol Pot on 5 January 1979, and to fight the Vietnamese annexationist enemy aggressors and annihilate them at all costs.

At present, the heroic people and the heroic Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea are waging a resolute struggle and will never bow to the Vietnamese enemy. Experiences in the history of the struggle of the Kampuchean people themselves, as well as those in the history of peoples the world over, have clearly shown that any people who are the victim of foreign aggression and oppression, when resolved to fight, will inevitably triumph. We have now preserved all our effective strength. All the leaders, headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Prime Minister of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, Pol Pot, are now leading the Kampuchean people, on the sacred territory of Kampuchea, in a valiant struggle, and are all resolutely and firmly determined to hold aloft forever the banner of the Kampuchean nation, the banner of independence, sowereignty,

territorial integrity, national honour and dignity, and the banner of the race of Kampuchea, regardless of the obstacles that have to be surmounted and the sacrifices that have to be made.

The Government of Democratic Kampuchea, with Comrade Secretary Pol Pot as Prime Minister, responsible as it is for the destiny of the whole Kampuchean nation and the entire Kampuchean people, appeals to:

- 1. All peace and justice-loving Governments and peoples the world over to aid and support, by all means and in all ways, its just struggle against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors and annexationists, to condemn this aggression to discontinue all assistance and support for Viet Nam and to demand the immediate and complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese from the territory of Kampuchea.
 - 2. All Kampuchean compatriots, at home and abroad, to unite and engage in a resolute struggle not to become slaves of the Vietnamese, to ensure that their nation does not disappear, and not to let the Vietnamese plunder and oppress Kampuchea at will. The Vietnamese enemy is exacerbating the differences with the whole nation and people of Kampuchea. These differences are very deep-seated and are becoming even more profound with each passing day. Consequently, the Vietnamese enemy is now in the crater of a volcano of national hatred on the part of the whole nation and people of Kampuchea, who are fighting against them, and everyone has clearly perceived the nature of these profoundly antagonistic and acute differences.

The entire Kampuchean people will form a very broad united national democratic and patriotic front to fight the Vietnamese aggressors to the bitter end, to annihilate them, and to liberate all the occupied territories and thus make their contribution to peace, security and stability in Asia and in the Pacific region. Final victory will belong to the people of Kampuchea.

The nation of Kampuchea, the people of Kampuchea, the Kampuchean race and Kampuchean traditions and civilized station will live forever!

Campuches are weging a resolute struggle and will never bow to the Vistanson energy. Experiences in the history of the arruggle of the Campuchess paces.

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Final Statement to the Security Council

Ву

Mr. THIOUNN PRASITH (Democratic Kampuchea)

January 15, 1979

First, at the conclusion of this debate in the Security Council on Viet Nam's invasion of and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea, the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea would like to pay a sincere tribute to you, Mr. President, for having conducted the proceedings of the Council with remarkable wisdom and outstanding experience. Those qualifites are based on the noble ideal of justice, on the principles of non-alignment and on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to which your great country Jamaica, our friend, is firmly attached, It is that attachment which has served to thwart all the delaying manoeuvres, the sophisms, the lies, the calumnies and the insults of the Soviet Union, the accomplice in and instigator of the aggression against my country and of the massacres of my people perpetrated by Viet Nam.

The delegation of Democratic Kampuchea would also like to pay a heartfelt tribute to all the non-aligned countries which are members of the Security Council. The unity of action shown by all their delegations throughout this debate has demonstrated the vitality which characterizes the non-aligned movement as an independent force outside the various blocs. It is also a demonstration of the solidarity of the non-aligned countries in the face of the deliberate violation and flagrant betrayal of the fundamental policies and principles of non-alignment by Viet Nam, which has usurped the label of "non-aligned" in order to undermine the movement from within and serve its regional expansionist and annexationist ambition.

The high sense of responsibility towards the defence and preservation of the noble principles of non-alignment displayed by the representatives of Kuwait, Bangladesh, Jamaica, Gabon, Nigeria, Zambia and Bolivia, as well as other representatives of genuinely non-aligned countries who have spoken here in defence of our just cause, is proof of the determination of the non-aligned countries to defend at all costs peace, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the right of every people to decide its own destiny, and to speak out against any act of aggression, expansion or annexation perpetrated by Viet Nam, the Soviet Union and their accomplices.

My delegation would also like to pay a sincere tribute to the United States of America, France, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Norther Ireland, which have shown their deep sympathy for the strugg of the people of Kampuchea, their condemnation of the Vietna ese aggression against and invasion of Democratic Kampuchea and their support for a democratic, independent and sovereig Kampuchea with its territorial integrity.

Finally, my delegation would like to pay a special tribute and express its deep and sincere thanks to the friend People's Republic of China, which, in the debate in the Security Council as everywhere else, has always shown its active solidarity with the just cause of Democratic Kampuchea and its people, on the basis of strict mutual respect, equality and reciprocal non-interference in internal affairs.

Furthermore, both during this debate and outside the Security Council chamber, our neighbours in South-East Asia, the countries of ASEAN, and in Asia, the non-aligned countries and all countries devoted to peace and justice in Asia, Africa, Europe, America and Oceania, have denounced and strongly expressed their support for the cause of the defence of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Democratic Kampuchea. They have demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Vietnamese occupation troops from Democratic Kampuchea and called on Viet Nam to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Democratic Kampuchea and the right of the people of Kampuchea to decide their destiny for themselves.

The debate in the Security Council as well as the vote that has just taken place have clearly shown that the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, which it is my honour to represent, is the sole legal and legitimate Government of Kampuchea. They have also shown that Viet Nam is the aggressor against and the invader of Kampuchea and that it is sowing devastation in my country and death among my people, scorning the most elementary principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, scorning the unanimous condemnation of the peoples of countries devoted to peace, justice and independence throughout the world, and in monstrous violation of the most elementary sacred rights of States.

The predictable veto of the large Soviet expansionist Power has not prevented condemnation of the aggression
of Viet Nam against Democratic Kampuchea. On the contrary,
that veto only serves to confirm, once again the aggressive,
expansionist, warlike, treacherous and ferocious nature of
the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese aggression against Democratic Kampuchea and the Soviet veto, above and beyond the

question of the existence of Democratic Kampuchea as an independent, sovereign, peaceful, neutral and non-aligned country, reveal the real threat posed by the regional expansionist policy of Viet Nam and the global aggressive and expansionist policy of the Soviet Union for all the peoples and countries of the world -- and in particular for the peoples of the small countries of South-East Asia, Asia and the entire world.

The Soviet veto is but the flagrant expression of the isolation of the Soviet Union and Viet Nam and their accomplices, in the face of the unanimous condemnation of all the countries devoted to peace and independence, Members of the United Nations. The debate in the Security Council are an encouragement for the resolute struggle that our people and our revolutionary army is waging under the . direction of its legal Government, presided over by Prime Minister Pol Pot. This debate constitutes for us valuable moral, political and diplomatic support. To all the countries members of the Security Council which have been good enough to cast their votes in support of the just cause of the people of Kampuchea and of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, and to all the countries whose representatives have spoken out here in defence of our just struggle and condemned the fascist Vietnamese aggression, the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea addresses its deep and sincere gratitude. The people of Kampuchea and the Government of Democratic Kampuchea will never forget this act of justice which they have performed at this the most difficult time in the history of Kampuchea.

(Here the Ambassador quoted extensively from the January 11 Statement of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea)

It is with that determination and conviction that the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea will continue to harbour hopes that the peoples of the five continents, the Security Council and the United Nations will continue their support for the just struggle of the people of Kampuchea as they endeavor to defend and preserve an independent, sovereign, neutral and non-aligned Democratic Kampuchea with respect for its territorial integrity.

It is with those sentiments that I wish to thank representatives for their kind concern and attention.

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don F The invasion of Kampuchea began on December 25, 1979 with about 100,000 Vietnames by or troops, elements of 12 divisions. The Vietnamese attacked in three columns, the first one be the'Central Highlands into Kampuchea's northeast where most of the earlier fighting had all s gone on and hwere much of the Kampuchean army was concentrated. The second column t sup attacked through the Parrots Beak area west of Ho Chi Minh City, threatening Phnom Percellig from the east and north. The third column attacked out of the Mekong River Delta region rowh striking for the port city of Kompong Som and threatening Phnom Penh from the west and e sha south. By January 7, the Vietnamese columns were in Phnom Penh and Vietnamese units - ea in were racing up both sides of the Tonle Sap, the large lake in central Kampuchea, seeking fas out Kampuchean army strongholds and moving towards the Thai border. This was the scenario of the invasion that left Vietnamese military units in control of most of the ase a cities and national highways by the end of the second week in January. ampu

I want to speak for a moment about what was the military and political strategy by both. The the Vietnamese and Kampucheans for the first four weeks of the invasion. te ci

The Vietnamese strategy was mapped out and directed by Vietnamese Army chief-of-stargel General Van Tien Dung--the "Blooming Lotus" strategy. This is the same general and the as b same strategy that led to the rapid capture of Saigon by the Vietnamese in the spring of tive 1975. The features of this strategy are those of a lightning attack. The Vietnamese army montr fast under heavy plane and artillery cover. During the attack the Vietnamese flew an ras I average of 100 air sorties per day using Mig 21s and captured US A-37s and F-5s and using atio all manner of modern anti-personnel weapons, including US cluster bombs. The attack was rem spearheaded by massed tank assult using largely Soviet-built tanks, the latest Pt-76 amphibious tanks and older T-54 tanks. The "Blooming Lotus" strategy was to use the roads, hit and occupy the cities, bypass sharp pockets of resistance and leave behind mopup units to contain and wipeout Kampuchean army units caught in the assult. The COULT military objective was to split the Kampuchean army into small units, destroy their contact he with other units and the Kampuchean army command and wipe them out before they had a chance to regroup.

The Vietnamese political objective was to seize the capital city of Phnom Penh, try and seize all or part of the Kampuchean army and government leaders and quickly secure enough order in the cities and most of the country to install a puppet government, that of the National United Front for National Salvation, quickly to gain legitimacy for that new government at the United Nations and around the world. The key to both these objects was rapid success and to catch the Kampuchean government and army unprepared.

As it turned out, the Kampuchean government was well prepared for this strategy. following an initial attempt to contain the attack in Northeast Kampuchea that resulted in a week of heavy fighting and about 1200 Vietnamese casualties, the Kampuchean army adopted a policy of strategic retreat. The Vietnamese assult was too strong and coming in too many directions. The Kampuchean army abandoned a static defense and abandoned Phnom Penh. When the Vietnamese arrived in Phnom Penh on January 7 and as they raced around the country from city to city they were not smashing Kampuchean army imits in the process, they were being allowed to spread their forces thin and occupy cities all over the country connected by long and very tenuous lines of communication and supply.

The Kampuchean military strategy during the first month of the invasion was to disperse their army groups, then regroup in fighting units of 800-1000 men. Western military analyists estimate that at least 4/5 of the 60,000 man Kampuchean army is intact today in these fighting groups. Since August, 1978, the Kampuchean government has been warning the world community and its own people about the upcoming Vietnamese invasion. During that time they also built up base areas stocked with supplies in the rugged mountains of Southwest Kampuchea. Following the abandonment of Phnom Penh the Kampuchean army and government high commands have been moved to these base areas and leading army commands ea 2/2/2

d government cadre are in the field at the head of the army units. No leading Kampuchean ames my or government cadre were killed or captured by the Vietnamese. Kampuchean tactics stowe been to allow the Vietnamese to overextend, and begin immediately to launch mainly had all scale attacks on the flanks and rear of the Vietnamese to harass, destroy equipment, immediately lines and keep the pressure on. On January 12, UPI quoted Thai military Pentelligence, saying that Kampuchean troops "opened like a wire cutter to let the steel iton, rowhead of the Vietnamese forces through and are closing behind it trying to clip off and a shaft." In addition to these harassment tactics, where the forces were favorable, Kampults has immediately launched large scale attacks at Vietnamese units that had been dropped king flas the advance moved up Kampuchea's highways. The most dramatic of these was as arly as mid-January when Kampuchea retook the port city of Kompong Som and the naval ase at Riem. These cities changed hands three times and are today controlled by the ampuchean army.

The political objectives of Democratic Kampuchea were to allow the Vietnamese to control ne cities, which means they control nothing. Since 1975, Kampuchea's cities have been strangely emptied of masses of people, and while there is some industry there, the nation he has been reorganized around a nation-wide network of self-sufficient agricultural coopertives. For the Vietnamese to have even a semblance of control in Kampuchea they have to you control the countryside, a task that would take a hundred thousand soldiers even if there was no armed resistance going on. With the Kampuchean army in the field and active into nation-wide, this task is monumental. Security in Kampuchea os very bad for the Vietnamese. Were Premier Pham Van Dong was scheduled to make a triumphant entry into Phnom Penh in January 14. That visit was postponed three times and when it finally happened on Feb 17 he visited a city absolutely empty except for rotting corpses and 6000 Kampucheans shipped in for the occasion. The fact that Vietnam has to control the countryside to control the country and the fact that the invasion did not destroy the Kampuchean army, but rather the fighting has escallated week by week has doomed the Vietnamese strategy for quidk

This failure and a very aggressive world-wide diplomatic effort by Kampuchea and her friends has also doomed Vietnam's plans to install a puppet government that had at least partial world recognition as the legitimate government. I'm sure everyone has followed the debate at the United Nations, where Prince Norodom Sihanouk came to represent the Pol Pot government and ask for world public opinion and government pressure to denounce the Vietnamese/Soviet-backed invasion of his country. In those debates, Vietnam was shocked and dismayed by the total lack of support for its position or its puppets. Not one country spoke in its defense except Cuba and the Soviet Union and the vote in the Security Council was 13-2 to support Kampuchea and condemn the invasion.

I want to speak now about the current situation in Kampuchea and the most recent news about the resistance.

In a word, the situation is both very good and very bad; very good for the Kampucheans and very bad for the Vietnamese. Kampuchean army units are fighting all over the country, from the Thai border to the Vietnamese border areas overrum by the Vietnamese during the first days of the fighting. Indeed, one Thai general put it this way: "The most intense level of activity is in the south and west of the country. But you could hardly throw a dart at the Kampuchean map blindfolded without hitting some spot where resistance is going on." Across the country bridges and roads have been blown up, isolating Vietnamese units and exposing them to hit and run attacks. Shipping on the Mekong already looks like the last few years of the US war in Cambodia, with sunk and grounded freighters and Vietnam having to run shipping in convoys with heavy naval protection. The New York Times reported on Feb 2 that most Kampuchean units had broken out of Vietnamese encirclement and that heavy fighting was going on on all major highways. Strategically the tide has shifted so that since Feb 1, the Vietnamese army has been on the defensive and Kampuchean

units are doing the attacking. Aside from the port cities mentioned earlier, Kampuchean puche troops have retaken the temple area around Angkor Wat in the northwest and have Vietnamese units under attack in Kampong Chhang, Pursat, Battambang and along the That ove border. Reuters reported on January 30 that Kampuchea had retaken takeo in the first division-sized assult launched since the fall of Phnom Penh; and they confirm that eman Kampuchean radio battle reports have matched Thai military intelligence reports on the Vietr fighting. Phnom Pei.h itself is surrounded, although not under heavy seige. AFP reported med on Feb 2 that an attack on Pochentong airport outside Phnom Penh had destroyed airplane vasio fuel and lubricants and killed Soviet and Cuhan advisors used by Vietnamese divisional headquarters for radio communication with aircraft. Democratic Kampuchea Radio has green reported that in January Vietnam suffered 14,000 casualties, lost 330 tanks and 12 aircraftass r and 300 Soviet and Cuban advisors were killed or wounded. While casualty figures are difficult to verify, all western military sources agree that the Vietnamese are suffering echni disproportionate losses. The Bangkok Post reported on Feb 4, citing Thai military sources he fa that Vietnam has committed 5 more divisions to the invasion, which plus logistic troops push the total Vietnamese military strength to about 180,000 men. Bet

One other point worth mentioning about the current situation. On Feb 1-2 a national he a congress, called by the supreme military commission of the Kampuchean Communist Party The I Central Committee met somewhere in Kampuchea. 183 leading military commanders and 23 he V leading political and government cadre from all areas of the country met for two days to as aggr the first month of experience in guerilla war. This fact alone indicates that the situation in Kampuchea is excellent, both that such a meeting was possible, security wise, and that all top commanders could be pulled out of the field in the midst of constant fighting.

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So what are the prospects for the military situation? Basically the Vietnamese "Blooming Lotus" strategy failed, and this was for several reasons: First, although the Vietnamese steel columns were well-armed and fast, when they took the cities and the roads they took nothing except an enourmous logistics headache. The US went this route before; sophisticated military equipment that had to be supplied constantly. Second, because the Kampucheans were prepared for exactly this kind of attack and based their strategy on it, allowing the Vietnamese to strike deep and get swollowed up. Finally, and most basically, the phrases we use of People's War and just defense of national territory and homeland versus agression and unjust war of imperialist domination are not empty categories, leftist rhetoric. They are strate lies that determine whether you win or lose, whether you mobilize the people to hide, comfort and aid your troops or you mobilize them to hate, oppose and eventually defeat you.

The Vietnamese face very real problems in the weeks ahead. In addition to having to fight a war of aggression in another country, against an arroused and organized people who have a coordinated, well-disciplined army in the field, the Vietnamese have encountered a nightmare in logistics and supply. Their main supply problems are tank fuel, ammo and medicine. Their tanks use two different types of fuel, 100% of which has to be imported from Warsaw pact countries. At present, all bridges are blown up in the country and their tanks are scattered all over the place. If they don't run out of fuel, the rainy season, which will start in mid-April, will immobilize all but the newest Soviet-built amphibious models. A second crucial point is food. An estimated 100,000 kilograms of rice per day is needed to keep the Vietnamese army in Kampuchea in fighting shape. Vietnam herself is facing an enormous rice deficit this year, both from the failure of agriculture to develop and from disasterous floods last fall. The UN estimates that deficit to be between 2.5 and 4 million tons. This is greater than the entire world trade in rice. (for example, this year the Philippines will have its greatest rice harvest and is projecting a surplus for export of 260,000 tons.) This istuation alone will put huge strains on the Vietnamese economy and will undoubtably lead to wholescale looting of rice from Kampuchean cooperatives just to keep the Vietnamese army fed. Already inside Vietnam there have been cases

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peasants resisting government attempts to force them to sell their rice to the government.

The overall cost of the invasion to Vietnam has destroyed any semblance of economic plan that as existed. On Feb 3, the party paper in Hanoi, Nhan Dan stated that the "primary task of etnam was armament expansion and war preparation" and called on the people and army e Vietnam to "tighten their belts and be combat ready day and night." The Vietnamese have ted med completely to the Soviet Union to bail them out of this economic disaster that the are vasion has brought on. Soviet/Vietnamese talks in Hanoi Jan 31-Feb 2 between Pham Van allong and I.V. Arkhipov resulted in a wide series of economic, scientific and technological greements between the two countries and promises of Soviet aid to cover all contingencies. The same reported that the talks "determined the fundamental orientation of cooperation to 1990" and that "Soviet/Vietnamese cooperation in fact comprises all realms of economy, science and echnology and Soviet assistance to Vietnam involves all comers of Vietnam." In addition to the fact that Vietnam is getting its tail kicked in Kampuchea, the invasion has driven the sinal nail in the coffin of Vietnamese independence and sovereignty.

Before I move on I want to talk for a minute about any confusion people might have as to me actual roles the Vietnamese, the Soviet Union and the puppet front played in the invasion. ty The Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation is purely a myth created by 23 he Vietnamese for international media consumption. In the first round of Vietnamese aggression into Kampuchea in 1977-78, no such front existed, even in the propaganda of the Tietnamese. This front was first announced by Hanoi on December 3, 1978, 22 days before the invasion. At that time Tass news service from Moscow reported that "real and revolutionary patriotic forces are rising in a resolute struggle for national salvation in Kampuchea" and that they would make "most important contributions" to the overthrow of the Pol Pot government. Frankly, the puppet front is a joke, even as a puppet, Heng Samrin, head of the front government, is an unknown. Variously reported as a former Kampuchean army commander, division commander, regiment or battalion commander, no independent sources have yet identified him as having anything at all to do with any leading post in the Kampuchean army or government prior to Dec. 3. The only "independent" story that has credited the Front with liberating Kampuchea was an East German news film, shown on US tv, which covered the victory meeting Heng Samrin addressed in Phnom Penh in January. Even a journalist delegation from the Italian Communist Party reported only Vietnamese troops in Phnom Penh, and only Vietnamese administrators running the captured cities. Refugees recently interviewed in Thailand said that when troops entered their village they were all Vietnamese, 250 of them, with one Cambodian from South Vietnam acting as interpreter.

The evidence that it was solely the Vietnamese who invaded is overwhelming. On Jan 21 the naval landing on Kok Kong Island was witnessed by a boatful of AP newsmen. The naval flotilla was flying Kampuchean National United Front flags but it consisted of Sovietbuilt rocket-launching destroyers, landing barges, transport vessels and patrol boats. Also an American-built patrol boat given to the SVN navy in 1961 and a US-built oiler given to SVN in 1970, both captured in 1975 at the end of the US war. All the troops landing on Kok Kong Island were Vietnamese with no disguise attempted. Almost all information about the invasion has come from western military sources. These are not merely to be suspected as being news leaks for propaganda purposes. The information comes from three sources; military analysts in Thailand who have electronic equipment left by the US that can monitor radio conversations down to platoon commander levels, American satellite reports, and US Lockheed SR-71 high-flying reconnaissance aircraft. Direct Soviet involvement in the invasion is harder to verify. The British newspaper "Daily Mail" on Jan 8, based on its reporters being in Vietnam right before the invasion, reported that "every tactical move by Vietnam's 307 Division was planned in consultation with the senior Soviet military officers travelling with it." By the time of the invasion there were over 4000 Soviet and other Warsaw pact advisors actively working at all levels inside the Vietnamese military.

Around the question of military supplies there can be no doubt. Among other things, mpu western journalists in Thailand have taken photos of hundreds of empty ammo cases float in tino in the Gulf of Siam with Soviet Army markings.

So that is a summary of the invasion and the current activity of resistance. The invasion and in was a naked example of aggression by one country against its neighbor. Vietnam has usalte various excuses and rationalizations for the invasion, ranging from even more historical gan ranting than the US press about human rights violations in Kampuchea that gave them the rst "right" to overthrow the Pol Pot government in the name of and in the interest of the Kampuchean people; to an extremely lame attempt to portray the invasion as a strictly dmi om internal uprising by the Kampuchean people led by the puppet front. Up through Feb 15, md the Vietnamese ambassador to the UN was running around New York City claiming that there were NO Vietnamese troops at all in Kampuchea. Finally, Vietnam has tried to claim om that it was in fact Kampuchea who invaded them! and that it was China that put them up tar it, that Chinese residents in South Vietnamese were preparing to rise up in rebellion, and that Vietnam's role has been strictly defensive to protect their country from the maure of S Chinese and Kampucheans. The facts speak for themselves. Vietnam, backed and encouragous by the Soviet Union, invaded Kampuchea and are now bogged down in an aggressive war outside their borders, a war of occupation and domination. The Kampuchean army and cau government, led by Pol Pot, has organized the resistance of the people and are dealing pub some fairly telling blows against both the Vietnamese and the Soviet's plans. These are ton 3 facts, but they don't explain the whys and wherefors. So I would like to end up today ask speaking to the question of why and how Vietnam got itself in this situation to begin lin with and what has been the role of the Soviet Union leading up to the invasion. yea

This is a big question, so I don't want to try and cover all the ins and outs now. What I would like to go into briefly now is the development of the Vietnamese/Soviet alliance that led directly to the invasion of Kampuchea, and the process that Vietnam went through over the last four years in abandoning its independent position in the owrld and accepting a greater and greater role as the Soviet Union's agent and ally in Southeast Asia. It would be wrong to say that the Soviet Union merely tricked Vietnam into an alliance and set them are lose into Kampuchea as payment for aid and assistance. Although the Soviet's courting of Vietnam only began to bear fruit in recent years, there have been many trends and tendence to inside the Vietnamese Party for years that especially boded ill for her relations with revolutionary forces in Cambodia and Laos. I would like to speak about some more recent events in Southeast Asia that indicate that both Vietnam and the Soviet Union sought out the alliance and hoped to gain from it.

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Since the mid-Sixties the Soviet Union has peddled a proposal in Southwast Asia to set up an Asian Collective Security Pact. At no point, up til about two years ago, did any country except Mongolia treat the idea as a serious proposal. Since the end of the US war in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union has attacked the countries in the region, grouped into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, as a military bloc under direct US imperialist domination. This was also the line and approach Vietnam took after the last war, for instance at the last meeting of the non-aligned nations in Sri Lanka. Vietnam also talked a lot about supporting the revolutionary struggles of the people in Southeast Asia. At first, however, they disassociated themselves completely from the Soviet proposal for an Asian Collective Security Pact and adopted an independent foreign policy that sometimes did and sometimes didn't correspond to that of the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1977 both the Soviet and the Vietnamese line changed, a change that was noted with surprise and guarded enthusiasm by the other countries in the region. The Soviet Union dropped most of attacks on ASEAN and Vietnam began for the first time to seek out diplomatic relations and trade. As the months progressed, it became increasingly clear that Vietnam and the Soviets were acting more as a team, with the Soviet Union floating out general ideas and Vietnam

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ting as their agent in Southeast Asia.

In the first months of 1978 relations between China and Vietnam finally broke down syond repair and with the expulsion of over one hundred thousand Chinese from Vietnam and Vietnam responded by formally joining Comecon, the Soviet bloc economic real regarization, in June 1978, the timing of which also corresponded with the defeat of the rest Vietnamese military aggression into Kampuchea and a stalemate on that front. The imission of Vietnam to Comecon was not fundamentally to replace aid that had been flowing from China, however. In fact, only five of 16 projects that Vietnam went to Comecon to mind were approved and Vietnam had already established trade patterns for most of its exports to Soviet-bloc countries that have not been significantly altered. Mainly the lair comecon connection opened a pipeline of arms and military supplies to Vietnam that up started flowing at full speed in August and has increased to this day.

During October last year, Vietnamese premier Pham Van Dong traveled to all countries Tura of Southeast Asia on a "goodwill" visit. While there he tried his best to reassure each Dura country that Vietnam had no designs on any other country, that it would be interested in membership in ASEAN, and that an era of peace and friendship was at hand. Two particulars caught the attention of Southeast Asia. First, in every country, the Vietnamese Premier publicly disassociated his government form the Communist parties and revolutionary struggles thein Southeast Asia. He pledged that Vietnam would give no aid to any of them. Secondly, he asked each country to accept Vietnam as part of ASEAN and to redefine that group along the lines that the Soviet Union has been pushing for an Asian Collective Security Pact for 15 years. Every nation in the region welcomed Pham Van Dong with open disbelief. Every state leader commented that Vietnam was now doing the Soviet's dirty work for them, and every country politely declined the offer, while keeping the door open for more state-tostate relations. As soon as the Vietnamese premier returned home, he and Le Duan, secretary of the Vietnamese party, took off to Moscow, where they signed a "treaty of friendship and cooperation" with the Soviet Union which included a military alliance clause and which led to another increase in military supplies to Vietnam.

Until the signing of the treaty with the Soviet Union and the invasion of Kampuchea two months later, Vietnam was making real gains in the region with the suggestion that she, and by proxy the Soviet Union, had a partnership role to play in Southeast Asia. Although no country was prepared to accept this on face value, Vietnam had broken through some of its isolation and was accepted, at least in the realm of state-to-state relations. The events leading up to the invasion, however, have sown great fields of open hostility. Country after country has taken up the analysis offered earlier by China that Vietnam was playing the role of another Cuba in the region. Most open about these sentiments have been the Thais, now faced with the prospect of Vietnamese armor a mere 80 miles from Bangkok. And amazingly, Vietnam, although under the fire of oncreasing Kampuchean resistance, has taken steps to put pressure on the Thai government to come to more favorable terms with Vietnam. The Thai paper "Tong Hua Yid Pao," quoting an unnamed government source, reported on Feb 3 that the puppet front had announced that it "unconditionally permits Thai fishing boats to operate in Kampuchean territorial waters." The Thai government denounced this as a scheme to curry favor, saying: "when all lies cannot deceive the ASEAN member countries, Vietnam and its puppet regime in Phnom Penh changed their tactics in a vain attempt to lure them," Also the puppet front announced "its willingness to negotiate the boundary question with Thailand." The Thai government stated that there was obviously a heinous design behind this declaration, recalling that the first thing Vietnam did with Kampuchea after the US war was to ask to renegotiate the border.

chea One other major role Vietnam has played in Southeast Asia in the last year has been ed fig around the refugee situation. Not only were well over 100,000 Vietnamese of Chinese oppos descent forced out of North Vietnam last year into southern China, but refugees from contr South Vietnam have begun to move at flood proportions into other countries in Southeast inely Asia. Up until January, 20,000 refugees of both Chinese and Vietnamese origin were o rea entering Malaysia alone each month. This refugee situation is not a spontaneous flight from Vietnam. Rather it is organized directl, from the Vietnamese Party's Politboro, under o wh pend the direct leadership of Nguyen Van Linh, who last month stated in a press interview that bee Vietnam had as many as 2,000,000 refugees that it could spare. What's more, the refuge an In situation is organized by Vietnamese officials charging people thousands of dollars for exit papers and the Vietnamese government arranging for freighters to dock in the Mekong hear Delta to load up. This "trade" in refugees has been a major destabilizing force throughould is Southeast Asia, as government after government has tried to close their shores to the iets refugees after accepting thousands and getting stuck with the burden of caring for and finding homes and jobs for them. This situation and the open Vietnam/Soviet alliance that her, resulted in the invasion of Kampuchea has made Vietnam the main enemy to the stability urted and peace of the entire region. star

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It is in this context that the invasion of Kampuchea must be seen. The situation in Kampuchea is not a simple border war. It is not an internal uprising aided by an outside th th power interested in promoting revolutionary struggle. It is not a proxy war between China reng and Russia with Vietnam and Kampuchea playing the role of pawns. The invasion of d th Kampuchea is an ominous portent of things to come in the world. Vietnam has mortgaged in rev country and its future to the Soviet Union in return for the aid and support for it to carry cial its aims of dominating all of Indochina and extending its influence throughout Southeast Asia. Without the Soviet aid Vietnam could never have made its move this year. The Sovietunt alliance also gave them a guarantee of direct Soviet involvement if China came to the aid hile of Kampuchea. In a very real sense, Vietnam had to move this year or never. Kampuchea's orld internal situation was growing stronger every month. For two years she had been a rice emoking Last fall she began to actively open up diplomatic relations with the rest of the world. By oun December 1979 Kampuchea would have been a fully participating member of the world community and there would have been no hope to isolate her diplomatically by playing on the propaganda war around human rights that western media and US politicians had fanned up. The Soviet Union took advantage of Vienam's isolation and domestic weaknesses to true her up with economic and military ribbons and encourage her aspirations at regional hegemony. On balance, Vietnam must have weighed the potential gains and losses and thought she had a good chance of conquering Kampuchea quickly, and thereby aiding both her foreign aspirations and domestic economic problems. In fact they ended up buying a bill of goods and placing themselves in an awful position, both with world opinion and with their ability to solve their own domestic contradictions. And when they invaded they acted to occupy, conquer and dominate the country.

As a former anti-war activist I would like to say that for a long while it was difficult for me to understand how Vietnam, which for so many years was a victim of imperialism and aggression, has in just a few years become a hegemonist power bullying her small and weaker neighbors. Vietnam's 30 year stubborn struggle against foreign conquerors and for independence and national unification won such prestige among her friends that we overlooked certain indications as well as the warnings of some observers who had been study Vietnam's policies that an Indochina wide hegemonism was emerging in that country. Viet had enjoyed such prestige that many Americans were prepared to believe Vietnam's lipsers to non-alignment or Vietnam's claims that China, as a big country, was trying to lord over her smaller neighbor. Nevertheless, politics is not mathematics, in which everything must always accord with formal logic. The invasion of Kampuchea throws the facts in our face that what was regarded as an "illogical" prediction has become a reality. Vietnam is

ed fighting with China, but it has acted to overthrow the Kampuchean government which opposed its hegemonist designs on Indochina. (Off of such a rap one could well compare contrast Vietnam's actions in Kampuchea with China's in Vietnam.) For people who linely and consistently advocate the policy of non-interference and non-alignment, there o reason whatsoever to defend foreign aggression and occupation against a free and jo where does this leave us? It is not enough just to try and make sense of how events e been moving throughout Southeast Asia, or talk about Vietnam's historic aspirations Ige an Indochina Federation. By themselves, these tendencies and actions could have er ended up in 180,000 Vietnamese troops rampaging through Kampuchea. Very much at heart of answering why this situation came about is some sense of what direction the ld is moving in and what role the Soviet Union is playing today. Vietnam meeded the liets in order to make their move, But it was not the situation that Vietnam sought the viet Union out and twisted their arm to make them unwilling partners in their venture. her, it was the Soviet Union, from the early days of the US/Vietnam war, who have irted and urged the Vietnamese into their camp. The example of the invasion of Kampuchea startling and repugnant, but not unique in the world. Increasingly the Soviet Union is the march; not a march towards world revolution and socialism, but towards world war th the US. Kampuchea is a tuneup for them; a preliminary bout where they are testing their ength and that of their allies against the resolve of the US and the resistance of China d the people of the world. This is the lesson of the invasion of Kampuchea; not that we Fre wrong to support the people of Vietnam, Lacs and Cambodia in the last war; not that cialism can't work and we are condemned to an endless circle of war and confusion ound the world; or as the New York Times put it on Feb 19, the prospect of "socialist untries on both sides of the battlefields in Southeast Asia singing the 'International' nile they kill their class brothers and sisters." The lesson of Kampuchea is that war, orld war, is the trend that we face today, and that the Soviet Union is on the make, oking for that war, driven by its need to knock the US out of the ring and dominate ountry after country around the world. This is the meaning of their step by step courting f Vietnam, offering the carrot of aid and resources but driving a hard bargain in the rocess. Kampuchea is no isolated example of this trend. In the last year alond we have een assasinations in Yemen, coups in Afganistan, direct meddling in the national liberation truggles all over Africa, and open Soviet military provocation in the northern islands of Japan and against Norway. The list is long and ominous, and the new feature we face pday is the Soviet Union stepping up its military buildup, intervention and control broughout the world. What the Soviet Union gains from its alliance with Vietnam is very concrete; by encouraging Vietnam to occupy Kampuchea the Soviets hope to seize the rice and fishing areas and make Vietnam stable economically and secure enough to venture out through Southeast Asia. Vietnam offers prime naval installations at Cam Ranh Bay that would allow the Soviets to expand their navy out of their ice-bound Siberian ports and directly threaten the sea lanes and oil routes between the Middle East and Japan. The unleasing of Vietnam to overrun Kampuchea also threatens China and causes great turmoil and realignment in all of Southeast Asia, a situation ripe for imperialst penetration. Kampuchea is not key in the Soviet Union's plans to challenge the US around the world; no more key than Afganistan, Ethiopia or Angola. When the Soviet Union finally decides to move, it will go straight to the juggler, straight up against the US in Europe. But the features of the invasion are in fact the features that more and more characterize the Soviet's plans; subversion and aggression against independent nations, all under the slogans of revolution and freedom.

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There is another lesson to be drawn from Kampuchea, however. And that is the one of resistance. The Kampuchean people have rallied to the army and government of Democra-Kampuchea and are waging tit-for-tat struggle to defend their independence, sovereign and national integrity. This lesson will not be lost on the people of the world either. Sar No amount of rationalization for aggression and occupation can gloss over the unjust and brutal experience that invasion entails. The invasion of Kampuchea represents a grave aga danger to peace and the aggressive acts of the Soviet Union and Vietnam are without a ed (doubt bringing us closer and closer to a new world war. But the resistance of the Kampuchean people lights our way in the face of this danger and proves that the struggle the people against aggression and hegemony can blunt and postpone the outbreak of that war. (Out of the point on resistance by Kampuchea one could develop a rap on China's bold moves to do the same on the border of Vietnam.) As an Iranian student said recently about the developing revolution in his country; "If the Soviet Union attempts to invade Iran, the people will crush them. It will take time but we will win." The American people have come through the recent anti-war movement learning many lessons about internationalism and support for the just struggles of the worlds people against aggression and imperialist domination. Our internationalist dutues and our responsibility is to take a good, long look at the world. That look demands that we oppose the Vietnamese/Sovietacked invasion of Kampuchea, oppose any attampt to legitimize the puppet front, and support the legitimate government of Democratic Kampuchea as the sole force leading the resistant of the Kampuchean people to defend their independence and freedom.

U.N. Security Council Discusses Viet Nam's Invasion of Kampuchea

THE U.N. Security Council met at the request of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea on the afternoon of January 11 to discuss Viet Nam's Soviet-backed armed aggression against Kampuchea.

In his January 3 message to the President of the Security Council, Kampuchean Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary had asked the Security Council to call an urgent meeting to condemn Viet Nam's act of aggression against his country.

Foiling Soviet Interference

Viet Nam's armed invasion of its small and weak neighbour Kampuchea has shocked all who uphold justice and love peace. Many delegates to the United Nations described the invasion as "a classic case of foreign aggression," and "another Czechoslovakia." Viet Nam's imperialist behaviour was unforgivable, they said. All the member states of the Security Council with the exception of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia agreed to Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary's request for an urgent meeting. The two dissenters came out with all sorts of objections and resorted to despicable tricks in an effort to stop the meeting being called.

As soon as the Security Council meeting began on January 11, the Soviet representative launched a vitriolic attack against Democratic Kampuchea and trotted out a so-called "people's revolutionary council" which he described as the "sole and genuine representative" of Kampuchea. He said that his country was against holding of the meeting because the Soviet Union regarded what was happening in Kampuchea as "a pure concern of that country" and "should not be subject to a debate at the Security Council."

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The Czechoslovak representative echoed what Moscow's representative said.

Chinese Representative Chen Chu said that it was totally unjustified for the Soviet representative to misrepresent the large-scale armed aggression against Democratic Kampuchea currently launched by Viet Nam with the support of the Soviet Union as a "civil war" or as "internal affair" to oppose the holding of a formal Security Council meeting. It is fit and proper for the Government of Democratic Kampuchea to ask for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to take effective measures to condemn and check Vietnamese aggression. The Chinese Delegation moved that the Security Council should brush aside Soviet interference and sabotage and immediately adopt the agenda.

After the Chinese representative had spoken, the President of the Security Council announced that it was the opinion of the majority that the agenda to consider the telegram from Kampuchea's Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary should be adopted.

But the Soviet representative took the floor again and proposed that the meeting be convened on January 15 when a delegate of the puppet regime reached New York. The Chinese representative opposed the Soviet proposal.

A vote was taken and it showed that 13 were against and only two (the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia) were for the Soviet proposal.

A False Telegram

But that was not the end. The Soviet representative brought out his last card. He asked the Security Council to invite a so-called representative from the "people's revolutionary council" to participate in the discussions.

He produced a "telegram" from the "president" of the "people's revolutionary council" issued by the Vietnamese Permanent Mission to the United Nations on January 11 which said that the "people's revolutionary council" would send its "foreign minister" as its representative to attend the Security Council deliberations should there be such a meeting.

At this point, Chinese Representative Chen Chu took the floor. The "telegram" was a fraud, he said, because enquiries made to verify the authenticity of the telegram showed that it was forged. The telegraph company had confirmed that there was no direct line of communication between New York and Phnom Penh, but the telegram was purported to have come direct from Phnom Penh to New York. The assembled were stunned. All eyes were on the Soviet representative who, tight-lipped and slack-jawed, stood there dumbly licking his thumb. Loud twittering and astonished gasps filled the hall. It was a thundering condemnation of the big and small hegemonists for their despicable behaviour aimed at misleading the public for their own unspeakable political ends.

That same day a report by the Secretary-General on the credentials of the Democratic Kampuchean Delegation was distributed at the Headquarters of the United Nations. The report said: "The Secretary-General received the attached communication on January 9, 1979 signed by the Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea concerning the composition of the delegation of that country.' The current 33rd session of the General Assembly has accepted the credentials

of the Delegation of Democratic Kampuchea emanating from the same authority."

Samdech Sihanouk's Speech

Then the Security Council welcomed Samdech Sihanouk to speak in his capacity as senior



Samdech Sihanouk speaks at the U.N. Security Council.

representative and leader of the Delegation of the Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

Samdech Sihanouk said in his speech that in the 1960s and 1970s, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat had never ceased to state, to assert, to reaffirm and even to write to Norodom Sihanouk, who was then Head of State of Cambodia, that "now as in the future and to the very end of time," their socialist Viet Nam, their revolutionary Viet Nam, their anticolonialist, anti-imperialist, anti-war Viet Nam believed it to be and would continue to believe it to be their sacred duty scrupulously and irreversibly to respect the independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of "fraternal" Kampuchea.

But, right after the final victory in April 1975—a victory over imperialism—and in the wake of the reunification of the two Viet Nams, north and south, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam decided, cold-bloodedly, to embark upon a very special "operation" against Kampuchea just as a starving boa-constrictor will spring upon some innocent prey.

Samdech Sihanouk said that Viet Nam has been greatly encouraged by its multifarious alliances — a de facto military alliance in particular with the U.S.S.R., one of the two world superpowers, and has drawn comfort from the total and unconditional support accorded it by the powers of the Warsaw Pact — with the ex-

ception of Romania. Viet Nam respected the "good" old traditions of shamelessly swallowing up small neighbours whenever the opportunity presented itself, and motivated also, Samdech Sihanouk pointed out, by a keen appetite that it had nurtured for many years, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam came to the point where it launched an all-out attack with all the power of its armed forces of a Hitlerian type for the conquest of Kampuchea.

The irresistible swarm of tanks and armoured cars, accompanied by a dozen infantry divisions supported by the most modern artillery, preceded and provided cover by innumerable aircraft of all types, including Mig-21s and some Mig-23s; that movement, a veritable German-style blitzkrieg, strongly reminiscence of the onrush of the Hitlerian armed forces to which so many European countries — France and Poland in particular — fell victims at the beginning of World War II.

All this shows how monstrous and dastardly is the conquest that has taken place of my poor little country by the big neighbour whose numerical superiority is compounded by a formidable military outfit armed as it is to the teeth by one of the two most formidable military powers in the world today.

Samdech Sihanouk pointed out that: Viet Nam has claimed that the present war being waged in Kampuchea is only a civil war without any Vietnamese involvement, the Kampuchean people, through me, have the honour of asserting vigorously that this war is purely a war of aggression, annexation, colonization and regional hegemonism unilaterally, arbitrarily and unjustly unleashed by the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam against tiny Kampuchea.

The so-called Kampuchea national united front for national salvation and its "government" are, in fact, only a pitiful smokescreen designed to hide from the outside world the criminal and repugnant anti-Kampuchean undertaking of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

Sihanouk went on to describe the situation now prevailing in Democratic Kampuchea:

- 1. The Vietnamese enemy has occupied Phnom Penh, our capital, most of our cities, and part of our countryside.
- 2. The Government and army of Democratic Kampuchea, the only legitimate state of Kampuchea, are respectively administering and defending our country in the unoccupied zone, which contains a small number of towns near

the Kampuchea-Thai border, as well as part of the national territory.

The leaders of Democratic Kampuchea are still in our country; the seat of our government is in one of our mountains. Our government, our army, our people, are fighting and will fight to the death against the Vietnamese expansionist and colonialist invader.

We shall never surrender. We may lose everything, but we will never lose our national honour.

Speaking of the Soviet Union's representative who had declared his country's support to a handful of Kampuchean traitors, Samdech Sihanouk said: In reply to his (the Soviet representative) surprising assertion, permit me to recall that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has the bad habit of remaining in Phnom Penh with Kampuchean traitors. Between 1970 and 1975, instead of standing shoulder to shoulder with the Kampuchean patriots who were fighting against imperialism and the clique of the traitor Lon Nol, the Soviet Embassy made a particular point of collaborating and co-operating with the reactionary Lon Nol group, fascists and war criminals that they were.

Samdech Sihanouk said he sincerely hopes that the Security Council condemns the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam; sees to it that there is no recognition of the so-called new state of Kampuchea; demands that Viet Nam put an immediate end to its aggression and withdraw all its armed forces; calls for a halt to and refusal to give any financial. economic, military, material or other aid to the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and its puppets in order to prevail upon Viet Nam to give up its brutal treatment of Kampuchea and its threatening of other countries of Southeast Asia and stability and peace in Asia and throughout the world. In the event that Viet Nam were to continue its totally unjustified aggression and maltreatment of Kampuchea, reconvene the Security Council in order to take new, appropriate measures to prevail upon Viet Nam to respect the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and peace of Kampuchea, in keeping with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter.

Chinese Representative Chen Chu in his speech strongly condemned Viet Nam for its aggression against Kampuchea and expressed resolute support for what Samdech Sihanouk said at the meeting and his just demands.

Many representatives of other countries spoke at the meeting on January 12 and 13, condemning Viet Nam for its aggression against

Kampuchea and demanding that the Vietnamese forces withdraw from Kampuchea immediately and totally.

Social-Imperialist Strategy in Asia

The Soviet strategy in Asia is to put down a strategic cordon around the continent, stretching from the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and up to Haishenwei (Vladivostok), and using the "Cuba of Asia," Viet Nam, as its hatchetman, seize the whole of Indochina to dominate Southeast Asia and South Asia and so edge the United States out of the continent.

DEFYING world public opinion, Hanoi hurled a dozen divisions of regular troops in its war of aggression against Kampuchea and occupied Phnom Penh, capital of Democratic Kampuchea. This naked aggression by the Vietnamese regional hegemonists against a weak sovereign neighbouring nation poses a serious threat to the peace and security of Southeast Asia and Asia as well as the rest of the world.

Hanoi's Aggression

The aggression against Kampuchea by Viet Nam, supported and instigated by Soviet socialimperialism, is an important part of the "global strategy" employed by Moscow in its bid for world hegemony. Indochina is midway between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans. foothold in Indochina, the Soviet Union could send its fleet through the Strait of Malacca into the Indian Ocean and on to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Its ships could also have free access east into the Pacific and south into Oceania. Moscow will thus have control of the important oil routes to Western Europe, the United States and Japan, and also complete an . arc of strategic encirclement. In the days of the old tsars Russia worked desperately to find an access to the Indian Ocean, but all they managed to do was to give their warships a short stopover in Cam Ranh Bay during the Russo-Japanese war. The new tsars are much more ambitious than the old tsars. Their threat to the peace in Asia, the Pacific region and the

whole world is many times greater than that of the old tsars.

Proceeding from its "global strategy," the Soviet Union is supporting Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea, but its goal is not only Indochina. Is it conceivable that this ambitious superpower, bent on world hegemony, will stop with Kampuchea and its domination of the whole of Indochina? It has become increasingly clear to the governments and public of Southeast Asian nations and other Asian countries that seizure of Indochina is only the Kremlin's first step in its expansionist pursuits in Southeast Asia. The peace and security of Southeast Asian countries and the whole of Asia will be gravely imperilled once Moscow and Hanoi, the major and minor hegemonists, have their way in the war of aggression against Kampuchea.

Disturbing Moves

Europe has been the focus of Soviet-U.S. rivalry. But, there, the two sides are essentially at a stalemate, so the Soviet Union started a large flanking move to encircle Western Europe with the main object of seizing sources of strategic materials vital to the West and controlling the major sea routes linking Western Europe and the United States and those linking the two with Africa and Asia. This would isolate Western Europe and the new tsars could then wait for their opportune moment to come. With this global strategy in mind, the Soviet Union is continuing to intensify its military threat against Western Europe and at the same time stepping up its aggression and expansion in Africa and the Middle East as well as West and Southeast Asia and the Pacific region.

Moscow's acts of aggression and expansionist intrigues in Asia last year are deeply disturbing.

• It engineered three coups d'etat in two months, killing the leaders of the three sovereign states.



Stage-managed.

Cartoon by Ding Cong

- Within weeks, it signed with lightning speed "friendship and co-operation" treaties with two Asian countries and one African country contiguous to Asia. These treaties are actually military or semi-military pacts, designed to draw these countries into its drive for world hegemony.
- It tried to consolidate its footholds in South and West Asia so as to encircle Pakistan and Iran. It provided the weapons for Baluchistan insurrectionists, tried to further dismember Pakistan and force it to obey its dictates. It exploited the internal turmoil in Iran to foster pro-Soviet forces, deployed troops along the border and tried to fish in troubled waters.
- It sabotaged Arab unity by stirring up and exacerbating ill will among Arab countries, wooing some of these countries to form "strategic alliances" with it, and created tension in this region.
- It upgraded its military might in the Far East and expanded its Pacific fleet. It repeatedly dispatched warships and planes to Japanese territorial waters and air space to intimidate Japan. At the same time, dangling "economic co-operation" as a bait spiced with diplomatic pressure, it tried to weaken Japan's relations with the United States and undermine friendship and co-operation between China and Japan.

Even more serious, the Soviet Union has made Viet Nam its "outpost" for expansion into Southeast Asia. Emboldened and backed by Moscow, the regional hegemonists in Hanoi with their obsession for an "Indochina federation," have recklessly launched a large-scale aggressive war against Kampuchea. The Soviet Union is itself shamelessly intervening in the war against Kampuchea by providing Hanoi withmoney, arms and advisers. Hanoi has dispatched large numbers of troops to occupy Laos and put the country under its control. The Soviet Union is also using Viet Nam against China in a most truculent manner and employing it as a Trojan horse in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations with a view to bringing these nations into its sphere of influence.

Strategic Encirclement

Consequently, the Soviet Union's counterrevolutionary strategy in Asia today is to cordon the continent from the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean right up to Haishenwei (Vladivostok) and using Viet Nam as its hatchetman, "the Cuba of Asia," in its central thrust to seize the whole of Indochina and then dominate Southeast Asia and South Asia and edge the United States out of Asia. With Viet Nam as its base, the Soviet Pacific fleet would be advanced several thousand kilometres into the Pacific. If this Soviet strategy succeeds it would be disastrous to Southeast Asia and would also put the United States and Japan at a distinct disadvantage in the Pacific and pose a serious menace to Western Europe.

So the critical situation prevailing in the Asia-Pacific region is the result of big hegemonism ganging up with the small hegemonism and making trouble there. The latter would not have been so truculent without the former's backing, while without the services of the latter, it would not be easy for the former to stir up all this trouble. Having Viet Nam as its junior partner, the Soviet Union is able to make Asians fight Asians and quicken the pace of its expansion and aggression in Asia. The role played by Viet Nam in the service of the Kremlin's Asian strategy surpasses that of Cuba in Africa. Viet Nam has become the source of war in Southeast Asia and the Kremlin's main bridgehead for aggression and expansionist pursuits in the continent.

It is obvious that if the Soviet Union succeeds in getting more strategic places as footholds in Asia, these footholds will buttress from the other end the positions it has gained in Africa and thus link its line of advance in the Pacific with that in the Indian Ocean and pave the way for a push into Oceania and

t

the South Pacific. This will place it in a much stronger position in its bid for world domination.

Asian Collective Security Scheme

An important move in the Kremlin's Asian strategy is to knock together an "Asian collective security system." With Hanoi now at its command, it thinks the time has come to revive its project. By concluding with one Asian country after another treaties of "peace and friendship" or of "good-neighbourliness and co-operation," it hopes to build up a network of treaties and eventually bring these countries together into a "collective security system."

Consequently, in its expansion overseas, Moscow is striving to hook certain Asian and African nations up with the Warsaw Pact, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (C.M.E.A.) and the "socialist community" under its thumb. Viet Nam's admission to the C.M.E.A., the Kremlin's pressure on member states of the

Warsaw Pact to increase their military spending and pledge "solidarity" with Viet Nam, and the use of military personnel of some Warsaw Pact countries in Soviet ventures in Africa—all shows that Moscow is contemplating the extension of its military bloc and economic grouping to cover Asia and Africa. This is a new development in the Kremlin's pursuit of its global strategy and is a reflection of the fact that its ability falls sadly short of its ambition. It, therefore, feels acutely the need for its partners in the "community" to share the burden in manpower and resources imposed on it by its worldwide expansionism.

The Soviet Union is noisily vilifying China as being guilty of "hegemonism" and "expansionism" and trying to poison China's relations with other Asian countries. At the same time, it is positioning its forces and rattling its sabre in the Asia-Pacific region. Some people point out that this is intended to encircle China. Of course, the Kremlin has China in mind in push-

Aggression on Kampuchea: Meticulously Planned

- The Soviet Union admitted Viet Nam into the "Council for Mutual Economic Assistance" on June 29 last year to shore up Hanoi economically and politically and confirmed Viet Nam as its "reliable outpost of socialism" in Southeast Asia.
- In mid-August, Moscow airlifted large quantities of arms including rockets to Viet Nam. Batch after batch of military "advisers" and personnel were sent to that country. Within a few months, the number of Soviet military "advisers" sent there exceeded 4,000. At the same time, the Soviet Union began to use the Cam Ranh base.
- Early last November, Le Duan, Pham Van Dong and other Vietnamese chieftains visited Moscow where they concluded with the Soviet Union a "treaty of friendship and co-operation" which has all the characteristics of a military alliance and openly proclaims that "military co-operation" exists between the two countries. Moscow provided Hanoi with Mig-23s and two 2,000-ton escort vessels.
- In late November, at the Moscow summit of Warsaw Pact countries, the

Soviet Union compelled these countries to increase their military expenditures and called for "joint support" for Viet Nam's aggression. This was an effort to extend the commitments of its military bloc in Eastern Europe to Indochina.

- On December 3, the Vietnamese authorities concocted a puppet organization "the Kampuchean national united front for national salvation" as their organizational preparation for their massive armed aggression. Immediately after the establishment of the "front," TASS relayed the news and other Soviet mass media clamoured that "real and revolutionary patriotic forces are rising in a resolute struggle for national salvation" in Kampuchea and that they would make "most important contributions" to the overthrow of the present regime in that country.
- On December 25, the Vietnamese aggressor troops began large-scale armed attacks from several directions against Kampuchea.
- On January 7, the aggressor troops occupied Phnom Penh. Democratic Kampuchea began to launch a nationwide people's war and the fight against Vietnamese and Soviet hegemonism entered a new stage.

ing expansionism in Asia. But its more important objective is to enlarge its sphere of influence and push out the influence of its arch rival, the United States, from Asia and threaten the peace and security of Japan and other Asian nations and that of the Southeast Asian nations in particular. It is short-sighted and dangerous to overlook this.

Doomed to Failure

The Soviet Union's Asian strategy is an important part of its global counter-revolutionary strategy. It thinks that it has scored a major gain in having Viet Nam as its stooge for the pursuit of hegemony in Asia. But, contrary to its wish, this actually serves to show up the atrocious features of the Soviet expansionists.

This also has opened the eyes of the people of Southeast Asia, the whole of Asia and the rest of the world and has thus promoted the growth of an international united front against hegemonism. Soviet social-imperialism is indulging in fantasies when it thinks that, with the weapons it has, and supported by a few hatchetmen, it can lord it over the world. Even if its acts of aggression succeed in one or two places, it cannot hope to check the historical trend against hegemonism. The Soviet Union tried to outflank Western Europe from Asia and Africa, but it led to mobilizing the countries and peoples of Europe, Asia and Africa, and Moscow has found itself besieged by the people of the world. The Soviet "Asian strategy" together with its global strategy cannot but fail.


The Bear and Cam Ranh Bay

CAM Ranh Bay lies in the Central Viet Nam Province of Phu Khanh. It faces the South China Sea in the east and straddles the sea lane between the Bashi Chan (between Taiwan and the Philippines) and the Strait of Malacca.

A deep and broad harbour, Cam Ranh Bay is known as one of the world's best. It is also a fine naval-air base in Southeast Asia.

Reports say that with the Soviet Union and Viet Nam setting the seal on their alliance by a treaty, Cam Ranh Bay has become a scene of hustle and bustle with frequent calls by Soviet warships through the Tsushima Strait. This reminds one of a piece of a history in the early 20th century when a fleet of the Russian navy sailed from Europe to fight its decisive battle with the Japanese navy in the Tsushima Strait. Before moving north, the Russian warships called at Cam Ranh.

Since the end of the Viet Nam war, the



new tsars in the Kremlin, prompted by their strategy for Asian and world domination, have become obsessed with a desire to use the up-to-date naval-air base in Cam Ranh Bay that was built by the United States at a cost of up-

wards of 200 million dollars in the 1960s. In the Kremlin's calculation, with this Vietnamese harbour at its disposal the Soviet forward naval position can be moved thousands of kilometres southward from Haishenwei (Vladivostok) to threaten at will the maritime routes between Southeast Asia and Japan as well as between Southeast Asia and the United States.

Thompson Scott, a former U.S. White House official and now a professor of the U.S. Taft University, quoting information from the U.S. Department of Defence, said that an agreement was reached between the Soviet Union and Viet Nam in 1976 with regard to Soviet use of Viet Nam's Cam Ranh Bay as a refuelling base for Soviet fleets. With an increasing presence of the Soviet naval squadrons in the Western Pacific, he said, there have been a considerable number of Soviet vessels visiting Cam Ranh Bay. Judging from the recent new developments of Viet Nam's joining the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the conclusion of the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty, the U.S. administration has predicted that within a year or two, Cam Ranh Bay will be available to the Soviet Union not only as a refuelling base but as a full-fledged naval base for maintenance. repairing, supply and other services. Japanese military analyst Iwano writes: "In accordance with the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty of friendship and co-operation, Moscow will naturally turn Cam Ranh Bay into a supply base for its fleets. By so doing, the Soviet navy can easily cut the oil route from the Middle East to Japan."

RESISTANCE

Kampuchean resistance fighters win new victories

The people of Kampuchea have launched a nationwide guerrilla resistance to the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of their country:

A UPI report from Bangkok Jan. 29 indicated that the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea had succeeded in recapturing the ancient Angkor Wat temple complex, the symbol of the Kampuchean nation. An AP dispatch added that Kampuchean troops "have retaken all or part of the port of Kampot on the Gulf of Thailand and most of Takeo Province. They are reported to have taken the Ream naval base, south of Kompong Som."

Washington Post correspondent Richard Nations observed in another Bangkok dispatch that a "new phase in the war" has begun and that guerrilla fighters of the Pol Pot government are "beginning to expose the weakness in Vietnam's armoured conquest of Cambodia."

A number of Western analysts who had initially described the Soviet-backed Vietnamese blitzkrieg against Kampuchea as "total" and "complete," are now realizing the reality of the situation: a protracted people's war has begun in Kampuchea under the leadership of Community Party Secretary Pol Pot.

Communist Parry Secretary Pol Pot.
When the more than 100,000 Vietnamese invaders poured into Kampuchea at the end of December with heavy-air support from Soviet MIGs, the leadership of the Kampuchean government and army chose to make a strategic retreat. Evacuating the cities and withdrawing army units from frontal positions, the main fighting force of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea was thus preserved, suffering few casualties. Now that army, aided by tens of thousands of mobilized peasants, is striking back against the Vietnamese invaders.

BROAD UNITED FRONT

When the Voice of Democratic Kampuchea radio resumed broadcasting on Jan. 11 after several days of silence that followed the Vietnamese capture of Phnom Penh, it issued an important message from the Kampuchean government leaders. The statement called for the formation of "the broadest national, democratic and patriotic united front" to "carry the fight against the Vietnamese aggressors through to the end."

The statement said that the resistance was "spreading all over the country" and that its intensity had surpassed the initial stages of the resistance to the U.S. imperialist aggression in 1970. It also pointed out that "we have now preserved our effective strength" and that all the government leaders were in the country, actively engaged in leading the fighting.

Thiounn Prasith, Kampuchean ambassador at the United Nations, told *The Call* that "fighting is taking place in all parts of the countryside." He added, "The Vietnamese may be able to occupy some of our towns and highways, but they will never be able to control our countryside. Our people will fight to the

Indeed reports coming out of Thailand and elsewhere indicate that the Vietnam-

ese invaders are not safe anywhere in Kampuchea. An Agence France-Presse report Jan. 21 detailed guerrilla assaults in Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri, Kratie, Svay Rieng, Kandal, Kampot, Battambang, Siem Reap, Takeo, and Koh Kong. Reuters reported that the strategic port of Kompong Som was in the hands of the Pol Pot forces.

The Wall Street Journal noted guerrilla fighting even in and around Phnom Penh and said that "the Cambodian resistance is beginning to cause serious logistics problems for the Vietnamese." Reports of fighting in virtually every province of Kampuchea have come from other sources.

Richard Nations in his commentary further observed that the Vietnamese were becoming as "road-bound as the Americans were in Vietnam." Nations said that the Kampucheans had stored food and supplies throughout the countryside and were able to attack from many different bases, especially in the Cardomom mountains, where it is believed that Pol Pot has established a headquarters. He said that the Kampuchean army had "regrouped in the Vietnamese rear" and now had "considerable

freedom of movement in the country-

Nations also revealed some of the Vietnamese invaders' key weaknesses, including the near-starvation situation inside Vietnam, and its inability to feed its occupation army in Kampuchea. "Rice will soon have to come from within Cambodia." Nations observed, "perhaps procured at gunpoint."

Thiounn Prasith commented to The Call, however, that "the Vietnamese think they can force our people to grow rice for them. But they cannot. Our people will never feed those who seek to occupy and control our country."


The last two weeks on the battlefield have proven that the Kampuchean people are in fact refusing to submit to the Soviet-Vietnamese aggression. They are responding to Pol Pot's appeal to form a broad national united front and resist.

No amount of "liberation" propaganda dished up by the Vietnamese puppet organization known as the "Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation" (KNUFNS) has been able to convince the people that the present situation is anything but an invasion by Vietnam. Although Vietnam has officially tried to insist that it has had "no role" in the fighting, even KNUFNS puppet leader Heng Samrin admitted in a Phnom Penh speech last week that "Vietnam assisted us in every way."

As the Kampuchean resistance intensifies and Heng Samrin is unable to demonstrate any significant following among the Kampuchean people, most governments of the world are continuing to oppose the Vietnamese invasion and give support to the Pol Pot government. In fact, only 14 countries—all closely aligned with the USSR—have offered formal recognition to the KNUFNS puppets.

In the face of international condemnation, the KNUFNS regime also decided not to attend last month's United Nations Security Council debate, although it had earlier announced its intention to do so. This week, KNUFNS will try again to gain some international legitimacy at the coordinating meeting of the nonaligned countries in Mozambique. But the non-aligned group has decided to continue to support the Pol Pot government, which will be represented at the meeting by the veteran patriotic prince and diplomat Penn Nouth.

The struggle to expel the Vietnamese invaders from Kampuchea will undoubtedly be a long and bitter one. But the recent events show that the Kampuchean people are determined to pursue the road of resistance and will not tolerate domination by the Soviet-Vietnamese forces.



Over 1,800 demonstrators (above) braved the bitter cold in Oslo, Norway, Jan. 12 to protest the Soviet-Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. They marched past the Vietnamese and Soviet embassies carrying torches and banners, chanting, "Vietnam out of Kampuchea!" "Soviet Union out of Indochina!" and "The Soviet Union instigates Vietnam!"

When the march passed the Soviet mission, many angered protesters threw their torches at the building. The demonstration was sponsored by the Norway-Kampuchea Association.

Similar demonstrations were held in cities throughout the world, including Belgium, Austria, Portugal, the Netherlands, Italy, Japan and Canada.

Rallies were held in Denmark and in cities throughout Sweden. In Sweden's capital, Stockholm, 1,300 people marched holding banners which read, "Vietnam get out of Kampuchea!" and "Defend the national independence of Kampuchea!"

In Paris, 1,000 workers, students and Kampuchean immigrant workers condemned the Vietnamese aggres-

sion.

A rally in Athens organized by the Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece drew 700 participants Jan. 15, and one sponsored by the Marxist-Leninist Communist Parly of Greece Jan. 16 was attended by 500.

One demonstration of particular significance was held at Banglandesh's Dacca University Jan. 8 in which several hundred students protested the Vietnamese aggression as an act of imperituist hegemonism and denounced Vietnam as a lackey of the Soviet Union. (Klassekampen photo)

bodia. In the course of the last two weeks, three combat divisions were reported to have been transferred from the Cambodian to the Chinese front. Some of this manpower is presumably being replaced in Cambodia by new conscripts.

Cambodia Fighting Heavy

Fighting in Cambodia continues to be heavy, analysts reported, with Vietnamese road traffic suffering heavy losses in ambushes.

In addition to the reports of conscripts being moved to Cambodia, analysts here say that Vietnam is shifting inmates of "re-education camps" — a euphemism for forced-labor camps for former members of the Saigon regime — to Cambodia to work.

The analysts here say that Vietnam's occupation force is experiencing difficulty in recruiting Cambodians for the ur-

gent task of rebuilding bridges and roads. The reason for this is said to be that Cambodians who collaborate with occupation forces are being subjected to heavy reprisals by guerrillas loyal to the ousted regime of Prime Minister Pol Pot.

Because the political prisoners taken to perform forced labor in Cambodia are unarmed and lightly guarded in hostile surroundings, transfer from the re-education camps to Cambodia is believed by knowledgeable observers here to be fraught with hazards.

Chinese May Be Reinforced

Despite Soviet, Vietnamese and Laotian charges that Chinese troops are violating the Laotian border, analysts here have detected no such moves. However, they do not rule out the possibility that Chinese troops on the border are being reinforced.

Pol Pot Forces Said to Retake Key Por

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 16 — In their first major setback of the war in Cambodia, Vietnamese forces were driven out of the port city of Kompong Som yesterday after heavy fighting, Western analysts reported today.

At the same time, four Vietnamese naval patrol vessels were shelling the Cambodian coast just below the southern extreme of the Thai border, near Khemarak Phouminville, the capital of Koh Kong Province in Cambodia. They were reported to have sunk a number of Cambodian coastal craft.

Unconfirmed reports provided by usually reliable sources said also that two Chinese merchant vessels had been spotted in the area and were presumed to be delivering or attempting to deliver military supplies to the Cambodian forces of Prime Minister Pol Pot's regime on shore. Such activity is likely to be rendered difficult, however, by the reported capture of Kong Island by Vietnamese troops.


Kong Island is well situated to control access to Cambodia's western seacoast, which consists largely of tidal flats. Supplies would have to be unloaded from freighters to lighter craft to be taken ashore, which greatly heightens the risk of such supply operations.

Heavy Action Throughout Region

The heavy action in all of Cambodia's southwestern corner indicates strongly that the organized remnants of the forces loyal to Prime Minister Pol Pot are determined to make this region a redoubt of resistance. Kompong Som was the only place in that area that Vietnamese forces had been able to wrest from the defenders.

Although Vietnam announced the fall of Cambodia's only seaport on Jan. 7, together with the capture of Phnom Penh, the capital, Western analysts said that they had not actually conquered the city and its port until two days later. Then they quickly found themselves on the defensive, and despite unusually heavy air support they were driven out yesterday.

The size of the Vietnamese force was not known to analysts here, nor was its fate. Analysts do not believe that the Cambodians will be able to hold Kompong Som against the heavy pressure that the Vietnamese are expected to



The New York Times/Jan. 17, 1979

bring to bear to regain this vital objec-

Kompong Som, formerly called Sihanoukville, was a small fishing port that Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the chief of state, ordered in the late 1950's and early 1960's should be developed into a port capable of accomodating oceangoing vessels. Its principal traffic in the subsequent years was arms and other supplies for Vietnamese Communist forces in their sanctuaries on the Cambodian side of the border between the two countries.

Western intelligence reports indicate that after the Cambodian Communist victory in 1975 the capacity of the port was tripled with Chinese technical assistance. It was the point of entry for almost all Chinese supplies, military and civilian, to Mr. Pol Pot's regime.

Continued fighting was reported throughout Cambodia as Vietnamese troops and Cambodian units that they had bypassed in their swift drive through the

country engaged one another.

Skirmishing continues around the provincial capital of Siem Reap, which raises the possibility that the celebrated temples of the old royal city of Angkor are in danger. Similarly, Cambodian troops remain ensconced on the almost unassailable temple mount of Preah Vihear, another great relic of Cambodia's past, and are said to be firing at unspecified targets below.

Preah Vihear was the object of a famous case before the International Court of Justice, which in 1963 rejected Thai-

land's claim to the border sanctuary approach to the temple mount from Thai side of the border, the only practione for civilian visitors when visits possible, is now heavily mined.

Vietnamese forces have visibly slot their advance toward the Thai bore presumably to organize a Cambodian surgent contingent that will make its pearance there, so as not to destroy Vietnamese fiction that it is the Cam dian United National Front for Natio Salvation that is "liberating" the cour rather than the Vietnamese Army inving it.

Cambodian forces apparently content to hold out in the village of Nimit, as six miles from the Thai border station Aranyaprathet. Heavy fighting is a said to continue along a stratrch of Rossouth of the great lake of the Tonle Sa

Sources of Broadcasts Traced

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 — United States officials said today that restransmitters purporting to broadcast each side in the Cambodian struggle peared to be situated outside Cambodian territory.

New York Times Jan. 17, 1979 (

Fighting in Cambodia Reported Intensifying

By HENRY KAMM Special to The New York Times

EANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 17—Fighting intensified yesterday in Cambodian constal areas captured earlier by Vietnamias forces and Vietnam is rushing heavy reinforcements into the country it has invaded, Western analysts reported today.

Vietnamese planes were reported to be bombing the provincial capital of Kampot on the south coast, captured in the drive that brought Vietnamese troops into Phnom Penh, the capital, on Jan. 7. The heavy air strikes indicate that significant resistance has risen in Kampot.

Heavy fighting also continued off the west coast. An undisclosed number of Thai fishermen were reported wounded, and Thailand is said to be considering a protest to Vietnam. About 100 Thai fishing boats were reported to have left Cambodian territorial waters, a traditional poaching ground for them.

Eight Vietnamese patrol boats are said to be shelling and firing rockets at the western shore, and fighting was also reported from Kong Island. Vietnam is said to be holding nearby Rong Island, which

controls access to Cambodia's only port, Kompong Som, formerly Sihanoukville.

On Monday Cambodian troops wrested control of the port city from the Vietnamese, who had captured it on Jan. 9. Yesterday, Vietnamese planes continued heavy raids there, indicating that the defenders were still holding out.

Meanwhile, Vietnamese troops are carrying the war to remote northern regions. Today Samrong, capital of Oddar Mean-

New York Times Jan. 18, 1979 (pg. 1+3)

chey Province, was reported under attack. Farther east in Preah Vihear Province, the district capital of Choam Khsan near the Thai border is also the scene of fighting.

Vietnamese troops are reported to be under heavy Cambodian pressure in two localities they captured earlier near the Thai border. They are Sisophon and Nimit, both on the road that leads to the border post of Poipet and the Thai town of Aranyaprathet across the creek that marks the frontier.

The war's center of gravity remains in


southwestern Cambodia, between the Cardamom and Elephant Mountain ranges along the Gulf of Siam. The routed forces of Prime Minister Pol Pot's regime, and perhaps the fallen leader himself, are desperately trying to establish a redoubt in this relatively inaccessible region. If they succeed, it will add some weight to their contention and that of China, their ally, that they are both the legitimate Government and an effective one. Analysts have reported that surviving members of the regime have given some indication that they are maintaining cohesion and effective communications.

Elsewhere in the country, east and west of the Mekong River, considerable fighting continues. Cambodian forces bypassed in Vietnam's swift thrust westward are offering stronger resistance now than during the Vietnamese advance.

Vietnam continues to maintain its hold, on most major Cambodian roads and towns, though sometimes the hold is a tenuous one. Even in provinces near the Vietnamese border and around Phnom Penh fighting remains heavy. Significant numbers of Vietnamese armored vehicles, including amphibious tanks, are reported to be moving westward on the highway linking Ho Chi Minh City, formerly Saigon, and Phnom Penh, and crossing the Mekong at Neak Luong.

The Vietnamese Air Force continues to carry out heavy raids with Americanand Soviet-built fighter-bombers and other planes converted to combat duty. They are using bombs of up to 500 pounds and American-made cluster bombs, which are antipersonnel weapons, left from American stocks abandoned in 1975.

Vietnamese troops continue to remain out of sight of the Thai border.



Wetnamese planes bombed Kompong Som and Kampot in the south, and Vietnamese forces battled troops loyal to ousted Pol Pot Government in the Nimit and Sisophon areas in the west and Samrong and Choam Khsan in the north.

Vietnamese Said to Assault Ruins Of a 2d Famous Cambodia Temple

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 19 — Vietnamese troops were assaulting Cambodian soldiers at the famous temple ruins of Preah Vihear, an 11th-century sanctuary high on a steep cliff on the Thai border, Western analysts reported today.

The Cambodians, dug in at the base of the craggy temple ruins, were reported to be under heavy artillery and mortar fire. There has been no indication from reports reaching here that the sanctuary itself had been damaged. The temple, with a magnificent stairway and gates, is second in importance only to the ruins of the royal city of Angkor.

Takeo Also Reported Retaken

The Cambodian garrison, whose soldiers are loyal to the routed regime of Pol Pot, has been reinforced in recent days by troops that retreated in the direction of the temple area. Those troops were being pursued by Vietnamese who seized the nearby district seat of Choam Khsan two days ago.

A number of helicopter landings in the temple area earlier in the week suggested to the analysts that important Cambodian figures might have sought refuge there.

These sources also reported that the province capital of Takeo, seized by the Vietnamese in their swift advance on

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Phnom Penh, had been recaptured by Cambodian forces. Takeo is less than 50 miles south of Phnom Penh, Cambodia's national capital.

Heavy fighting for control of the major roads in this region has been reported, and the Vietnamese Air Force was said to be playing an active part. In their thrust through eastern Cambodia, Vietnamese troops bypassed many Cambodian units and are now being severely harassed by them in widely scattered areas.

A Redoubt in the West

On Cambodia's western coast, Thai military sources say, Vietnamese troops, strongly supported by patrol boats, have captured or at least landed on all key islands. Cambodian forces have turned the southwestern region into a redoubt, and Vietnamese control of the of the islands is thought to be making it hard for China, Cambodia's ally, to resupply them.

The Cambodians are still reported resisting on the largest island, Kong, where Vietnamese air strikes continue. Thai sources reported that Cambodia might have lost control over the capital of Koh Kong Province, on the mainland. The town, Khemarak Phouminville, slightly south of the Thai border, has been heavily shelled from the sea because it is believed to be the site of an important military headquarters.

Thailand is watching the fighting at

Continued on Page 2, Column 3

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Vietnam Said to Attack a 2d Cambodian Temple Site

Continued From Page 1

Preah Vihear with particular attention because it has claimed the temple as part of its territory for many years. The International Court of Justice, however, has upheld Cambodia's right to the sanctu-

The rear slope of the temple, which is much less steep than the almost unscalable facade, leads into Thai territory. Since 1975, when the Cambodian Communists took power, this approach is said to have oeen heavily mined. The Thai side was the traditional route of access for the rare visitor to the sacred site, which is dedicated to the Hindu deities of Vishnu and Shiva. Access to Preah Vihear is difficult from either country since only jungle trails lead there.

Today, Vietnamese fire, which had previously been directed only against the base of the hill, was said to be aimed higher as defenders presumably were withdrawing toward the temple.

Concern Over Siem Reap

Concern was expressed here about continued fighting in the area of the province capital of Siem Reap, further to the west.

The town is the gateway to the huge Angkor complex to its north, and in the absence of details on the fighting around Siem Reap, fear was rising over the fate of Southeast Asia's greatest architectural treasure. In 1970, Vietnamese troops and Cambodian Communist guerrillas invaded the temple region and remained there until the end of the war. The main temple at Angkor suffered slight but irreparable damage.

Despite the resurgence of Cambodian resistance in various regions, the majority of diplomatic experts here persist in the belief that Vietnam's hold over Cambodia is irreversible.

According to Thai intelligence, the Cambodian Army, which had been estimated at about 80,000 men at the outset of the war, had by last week been reduced to 15,000 troops still capable of effective resistance.

At the start of the offensive, the Vietnamese were believed to have committed about 100,000 men. They reportedly have been reinforced since then.

e Fighting Is Reported Cambodian Provinces

NGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 21 (Reut-Clashes were reported today in odia between the troops loyal to the d Government of Pol Pot, the Camn Prime Minister, and forces cond by Vietnam.

plomatic sources said that the es occurred mainly in the provinces akeo and Kampot on Cambodia's teastern border with Vietnam.

e war has not produced the rush of gees into Thailand that had been exed, but about 2,400 Cambodians, bed to be the families of soldiers, have gathering 500 yards from the east-Thai border.

Jew York Times in: 22, 1979 (p. A7)

Peking Review - No. 4

VIETNAMESE AGGRESSION

Kampuchean Counterattacks

The Voice of Democratic Kampuchea radio on January

der policemen were wounded today in a clash with a group of soldiers trying to seek refuge in a district east of Bangkok. The group was driven back into Cambodia.

20 broadcast a bulletin reporting that fighting by Kampuchean armymen and people against the Vietnamese aggressors is going on in various parts of Kampuchea.

Fighting in Mondolkiri. The Kampuchean Revolutionary Army, with the close support of the local people in Koh Nhek County, fought valiantly on January 7 and 8 for 36 hours against the Vietnamese aggressors, killing nearly 200 and driving off the rest, leaving the Revolutionary Army in complete control of Koh Nhek County.

Fighting in Kratie. The Kampuchean Revolutionary Army on January 9 and 10 intercepted Vietnamese aggressors between Snoul and Kratie on Highway 13. and wiped out 160 enemy soldiers.

Fighting in Svay Rieng. The Kampuchean Revolutionary Army on January 10 mounted a fierce attack on Vietnamese aggressors stationed in Svay Rieng City. The K.R.A. destroyed enemy positions after 15 minutes of fighting and annihilated two battalions. Enemy survivors fled in disarray.

On Highway 4. After continuous fierce fighting on January 9 and 10 in Prey Nop and Tuk Sap. the Kampuchean Revolutionary Army repulsed Vietnamese invaders and regained control. More than 300 enemy troops were wiped out.

Fighting Near Phnom Penh. Kampuchean Revolutionary Army units and guerrillas on January 9 and 10 in Ponhea Lu and Kompong Lung Des Bacs attacked marauding Vietnamese invaders. They destroyed two enemy tanks, damaged

six enemy troop carriers and wiped out all the occupants. The K.R.A. also captured 30 pieces of weapons.

A January 20 commentary broadcast by the Voice of Democratic Kampuchea called upon the Kampuchean people in all walks of life, at home and abroad, to rally closely round the Kampuchean Communist Party and the Government of Democratic Kampuchea, continue resistance in the war against aggression by the Vietnamese aggressors backed by the Soviet international expansionists. The Kampuchean armymen and people, it said, will surmount every difficulty, expand the people's war and and thoroughly completely drive the Vietnamese aggressors out of Kampuchean territory.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION

The Call

Korea blasts Viet invasion as 'intolerable'

In a recent educial of major importance, the north Korean paper Rodong Simum condemned the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. The following are excerpts from the article:

According to reports, huge armed forces invading from outside have brought under their control almost the whole territory of Kampuchea including the capital

city of Phnom Penh.

The government of Democratic Kampuchea is an independent, lawful government established at the general will of the Kampuchean people.

Even according to the announcement of the Vietnamese side, the "National United Front for the National Salvation of Kampuchea" was formed about a month ago. How can it mobilize in such a short period vast quantities of military equipment, including so many planes, tanks and artillery pieces and regular armed forces of more than 10 divisions? This surpasses the imagination of the ordinary people.

It is not without reason that the world public views the present armed control of Democratic Kampuchea as one by a massive military action of the Vietnamese

It is intolerable to resort to an open armed action against a legitimate revolutionary power and overthrow

it, under whatever pretext it may be committed.

The Vietnamese control of Kampuchea by crossing the border through a massive military action is an outright infringement upon the national independence sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea and a crude violation of the publicly recognized interna-

tional law.

The present developments in Kampuchea give a serious lesson to the world people.

We witness clearly here once again that the ambition for dominating and controlling other countries can be seen in a comparably small country, too.

It is clear that if a precedent of one country dominating and controlling another country with strength is overlooked today, some other country will conquer and subjugate still another country tomorrow.

Therefore, the world people should heighten vigilance against all sorts of dominationist aggressive maneuvers and unite strength in opposing them.

Only by waging a vigorous struggle against imperialism and dominationism, can the people consolidate national independence, achieve the independent development of the country and build a free and peaceful, new world free from all manner of domination and subjugation.

We hope that the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea will be guaranteed, the kampuchean people be left to shape their destiny by themselves and an era of genuine peace come to Southeast Asia at an early date.

World Opinion

Big and Small Hegemonism Denounced

VIET Nam has moved more than 100,000 well-equipped regular troops to invade Kampuchea. In a Hitler-type blitz covered by Russian tanks, heavy artillery and fighters, they occupied large areas of Kampuchean territory including the capital Phnom Penh. This makes it known to the world that Viet Nam is the aggressor and the Soviet Union the stagemanager.

Viet Nam's invasion of Kampuchea threatens the security of that nation. It is also a grave move by the Soviet Union in its aggression and expansion in the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia in particular. This act of aggression by Viet Nam and its master, the

Soviet Union, naturally is condemned throughout the world.

Internal Conflict or Aggression by Viet Nam?

The Jamaica Daily News on January 6 reported that U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in answering questions raised by journalists said the Vietnamese alleged that the conflict is a domestic one. The United Nations, however, has evidence that Vietnamese armed forces have invaded the country and are taking part in the war.

The Yugoslav paper Borba in a signed commentary of January 8 said that all means including infantry, artillery, armoured vehicles

January 26, 1979 Peking Review

and airplanes have been used in the fighting on Kampuchean territory. "Hanoi has not concealed its support for the so-called Kampuchean national united front for national salvation and Moscow has not concealed its support for Hanoi." "It is hard to make people believe that such a clique or movement could have obtained airplanes, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, radios and other equipment after only one month of existence."

The Romanian paper *Scinteia* in a January 10 article said that Romania stands resolutely opposed to the toppling of the Kampuchean legal government by outside forces.

The French Le Nouveau Journal pointed out that Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea started long ago. It said: "... It was Viet Nam that initiated the first offensive in December 1977, and it is troops from Hanoi who have been dealing decisive blows for a year."

The Vietnamese authorities can by no means mask their 100,000 or more troops' invasion of Kampuchea behind the banner of "Kampuchean national united front for national salvation" and amid the din of growing "people's rebellion." Stuttgarter Zeitung of West Germany commented that, like the Americans in the role of imperialist aggressors in the past. Hanoi's troops "have used tanks and aircraft to invade Kampuchea." A Swedish Communist Party statement likens the Soviet-backed Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea to the Soviet Union's aggression against Czechoslovakia in 1968. The New York Times in a January 9 commentary also pointed out that the Vietnamese have always been straightforward, or in other words, been unscrupulous. No banner of the "Kampuchean national united front for national salvation" can hide the fact that the aggression is committed by the Vietnamese troops themselves.

Quisling Front

The French paper Le Figaro on January 9 said: "The proposition that there was an armed insurrection by the Khmer people against their leaders is obviously untenable. Phnom Penh succumbed to a military offensive of the Vietnamese army... Whatever verbal acrobatics are used to save appearances, the men who are going to assume power in Cambodia will be puppets named by Hanoi, quislings charged

with the job of administering a new Vietnamese province."

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The First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Belgium, Fernand Lefebvre, stated that the occupation of Phnom Penh and the establishment of a puppet regime by traitors and butchers under the signboard of the "Kampuchean national united front for national salvation" finalized the invasion of Kampuchea that had been going on for a year or more.

The Ottawa Journal of Canada editorialized that "nobody believes the fiction that the 'liberation' was carried out by Cambodians themselves under the so-called united front for national salvation"; "that's just a puppet group."

The British Financial Times on January 9 said in an editorial: "There can be no pretence that the invasion was carried out by a liberation force of dissident Cambodians. It was an act of aggression against a neighbouring country."

Viet Nam, Get Out of Kampuchea!

People in Bangladesh, Sweden, France, Canada and other countries recently held demonstrations strongly protesting Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea. Demonstrators carried posters saying: "Resolutely support the Kampuchean people's just struggle against Vietnamese aggression!" "We stand on the Kampuchean people's side!" "Vietnamese aggressors. get out of Kampuchea!" and "Behind Viet Nam is the Soviet Union!" Leaflets distributed by demonstrators in Paris called on all those who do not wish to see a Brezhnev-dominated world to support the Kampuchean people's war, support the Kampuchean Communist Party and defend the various peoples' right to independence and freedom.

In a joint statement issued on January 13 in Bangkok, the foreign ministers of the five ASEAN member countries said that they regretted "the armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea." They reaffirmed that the Kampuchean people have the right to "determine their future by themselves, free from interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise of their right to self-determination." "Towards this end," the statement said, "the ASEAN foreign ministers call for the immediate

and total withdrawal of the foreign forces from Kampuchean territory."

The Korean paper Rodong Sinmun in an editorial department article of January 13 denounced Viet Nam's aggression against Democratic Kampuchea. The article asked Viet Nam to have a second thought, that is to pull out all its armed forces from the country without delay. It expressed the hope that the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea would be ensured, the Kampuchean people themselves would control their own destiny and genuine peace in Southeast Asia would come, at an early date.

Political parties, organizations and newspapers in many countries also demanded that their governments stop economic and military aid to Viet Nam. Many mass organizations for friendship with Viet Nam announced their dissolution due to Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea.

Some countries have frozen aid to Viet Nam. The Japanese Foreign Ministry decided to freeze its economic aid to Viet Nam in concerted action with the five ASEAN member states. Five Japanese agricultural organizations, including national corporations, decided on January 9 to cancel their campaign to ship rice to Viet Nam.

American officials on January 9 announced that negotiations that had been going on for 18 months in Paris on establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and Viet Nam had been suspended owing to Viet Nam's invasion of Kampuchea.

Kuwait on January 8 rejected a Soviet demand that she oppose discussion of Viet Nam's aggression against Kampuchea in the U.N. Security Council.

Deal Seriously With Soviet Strategy

World public opinion roundly denounces the unscrupulous strategy of the Soviet Union in stage-managing Hanoi's aggression against Kampuchea and points out that people of all countries should sharpen their vigilance and deal with it seriously.

The Turkish daily *Tercuman* in a commentary pointed out that "using its partner Viet Nam as a pawn, the Soviet Union has occupied Kam-



Dacca students demonstrate before Soviet and Vietnamese embassies.

puchea, taking a further step in its pincer movement in the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia." The paper continued, "Having brought Democratic Yemen in the Middle East and Afghanistan in South Asia under its control, caused the shedding of blood in Iran and Turkey and intervened in Ethiopia and Angola, the Soviet Union now has instigated Viet Nam to invade and occupy Kampuchea, an independent member state of the United Nations close to the borders of China in Southeast Asia."

Tawit Seniwong Na Ayuthaya, former Minister of Defence and Member of the Thai National Legislative Assembly, told the press on January 8: "The occupation of Phnom Penh by the so-called 'Kampuchean national united front for national salvation' is an act of aggression committed by Viet Nam, at the instigation of the Soviet Union, against Democratic Kampuchea." "Once the whole of Kampuchea is annexed by Viet Nam, Thailand which stands as an outpost of ASEAN will become the next target," he pointed out.

Bhichai Rattakul, former Foreign Minister of Thailand, told the pressmen that the blitz Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea is an outcome of the Soviet-Vietnamese military co-operation treaty concluded last year, an attempt to step up the realization of the "Indochina federation" and to penetrate and expand into the ASEAN countries.

The Portuguese paper *O Dia* also reported that Hanoi's real role is as the "shock force" of the Kremlin, whose design is to seize positions for dominating Southeast Asia.

Chinese permanent delegation to the United Nations submitted to the Security Council an coneight-point proposition demning the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea. Meanwhile a draft resolution was tabled jointly on January 15 by seven non-aligned countries - Bangladesh, Bolivia, Gabon. Jamaica, Kuwait. Nigeria and Zambia - demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops from Kampuchea. As the demands and the draft resolution are all in the interest of safeguarding the aim and principles of the U.N. Charter and to check Vietnamese aggression and support the Kampuchean people's just cause, they had the support of the great majority of the Security Council member states.

The draft resolution of the non-aligned countries called upon all foreign forces involved in the situation in Democratic Kampuchea to observe an immediate ceasefire, to put an end to hostilities and to withdraw from that country. It also demanded that the parties concerned should adhere strictly to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states, so as to create an atmosphere conducive to the stability of the region.

Introducing the draft, the representative from Kuwait said that the draft sponsors coming

from the three largest continents in the world were not members of any military bloc. In spite of their differences in culture and societies, they were united in adhering to the principles of non-alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and to the cardinal principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, he said.

The seven-nation draft resolution was adopted finally by a vote of 13 to 2 at the Security Council. But the reasonable and just resolution was arbitrarily vetoed by the Soviet Union. This once again lays bare the hegemonist designs of the Soviet social-imperialists to undermine the fundamental aim and principles of the United Nations.



What did the correspondent find out in Phnom Penh.

by Fang Cheng

Vietnam's Push in Cambodia Has Neighbors Worried

By HENRY KAMM

Special to The New York Times

BANGKOK, Thailand, Jan. 4 — The Vietnamese onslaught against Cambodia, after months of warfare limited to the border region, has greatly intensified apprehension in Southeast Asia over Vietnam's ultimate aims.

Its prestige has been the principal casualty of the war and the resulting estrangement from China, in the consensus of Government officials of the region's non-Communist nations and of Western diplomats. Until the war was openly acknowledged on the last day of 1977 the Vietnamese were feared and respected, the sources say, but now they are only feared — an attitude inspired by suspicions that Vietnam, Southeast Asia's major military power, harbors ambitions of regional dominance.

Western analysts believe that direct Vietnamese pressure on Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital, is mounting. The analysts reported today that the provincial capital of Takeo, less than 50 miles from Phnom Penh, had fallen and that a

Vietnamese column was moving toward it on Highway 3.

Three other provincial centers have been captured — Stung Trang, capital of the province of the same name: Lomphat, capital of Ratanakiri, and Senmonorom, capital of Mondolkiri. Last week Vietnamese troops seized the provincial capital of Kratie.

Another important advance by the Vietnamese forces involves crossing the Mekong River north of Kompong Cham, the command center for the entire fighting front.

The respect for Vietnam arose from its victories over France and the United States, its reputation for ruthless efficiency in welding the northern part of the country into a totally dedicated war machine, its fierce will for independence and national dignity and its diplomatic skill in drawing boundless material support from both the Soviet Union and China while staying out of either's camp. It was also considered by much of the world the moral victor in its war with the United States.

Those perceptions have profoundly changed in the last year. Moreover, Vietnam's increasingly close ties with the Soviet Union, ratified last November in a friendship and cooperation treaty with a military clause, have added an extraneous but vital factor. When Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping of China visited Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in the same month, his contention that Vietnam represented a Soviet Trojan horse in Southeast Asia was well received.

In the Southeast Asian view, China is an unavoidable long-term threat, while the Soviet Union is regarded as a menacing power that had little success in establishing a real foothold in this region until Vietnam fell into its embrace.

Cambodians Stood Them Off

The decline in Vietnamese prestige began when it became evident that the lightly regarded Cambodian Army, outmanned and outgunned, was able to withstand a major Vietnamese onslaught last winter and not only kept Vietnam at bay through the year but also seriously disrupted the Vietnamese reconstruction program.

Peking's strong reaction against Hanoi, stemming at least in part from the departure of thousands of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam and culminating in June in a halt in economic assistance, was viewed here as indicating that Vietnam had lost the diplomatic cdge that had enabled it to deal with both Peking and Moscow through three decades of war.

Though the growing conflict between two potential enemies caused leaders of other Southeast Asian nations to breathe easier, it also resulted in concern over the introduction into the region of Communist superpower rivalry. Until that point the nations had skillfully avoided such traps, playing host to visits by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of Vietnam and Mr. Teng.

Vietnam Even Courted U.S.

Vietnam's increasing diplomatic isolation caused it not only to court the region's non-Communist nations but also to pursue the friendship of its former enemy, the United States.

Vietnam has also conceded difficulties in integrating the conquered South into a political, economic and social system as disciplined as that of the North, which has not enhanced its standing. Great damage to Vietnamese prestige has resulted from the acknowledgment of grave economic difficulties, particularly drastic food shortages.

tic food shortages.

While no Southeast Asian countries approve of the harsh regime of Prime Minister Pol Pot in Phnom Penh, they prefer an independent Cambodia to one under Vietnamese rule. Many Asian officials feel that a strong Chinese stance would find general approval throughout the region.

Dem York Times Jan. 5, 1979 (pg. A3) halt Khmer Rouge raids across the border. But the Vietnamese were battered by the tough Khmer. Vietnamese armor, which was sent to harass the Khmer, ran out of gas and had to be rescued by Vietnamese airmen flying captured American planes.

Viet Nam then changed its strategy. Hanoi decided to end the Khmer incursions once and for all when the next dry season rolled around. Green Vietnamese soldiers were replaced with seasoned troops. Dissident Khmer were welded into a fighting force that would take part in "spontaneous people's uprisings." Most important, the operation was assigned to Army Chief of Staff General Van Tien Dung, the tactician who directed the lightning conquest of Saigon in 1975.

Writing about the Saigon battle in his memoirs, Dung revealed that the opening attack on the highlands town of Ban Me Thuot was originally intended as no more than a probing operation. But the South Vietnamese army proved so weak that the test turned into a full-scale assault, which finally resulted in Saigon's fall.

In much the same way, some military analysts suspect, Dung's initial advance into Cambodia last month was intended as a limited operation to secure the eastern bank of the Mekong River. But fierce fighting between September and December so decimated the 40,000 Khmer Rouge forces stationed along the border that Dung decided to repeat his 1975 triumph and launch an all-out attack. The Vietnamese, using in some cases captured U.S. equipment, were overwhelming in both numbers and skill. In a single day, aided by Soviet pontoon bridges, an entire mechanized division of 10,000 men crossed the Mekong. Within a week Dung had conquered a third of Cambodia. By last week there remained only Pol Pot's last Khmer Rouge divisions to face the advancing enemy.

n Bangkok, Thai Premier Kriangsak Chamanand compared the heavy fighting beyond his border to "a fire in a neighbor's house." This blaze, however, cast menacing shadows throughout all Southeast Asia. The most intense heat was generated by the fact that the principal combatants are both wards of the region's two Socialist superpowers. China has long supported Cambodia with arms and guerrilla training. Peking's technicians have been providing expertise in telecommunications and irrigation, while 49 North Koreans attempted (unsuccessfully, as it turned out) to teach the Kampucheans to fly MiG aircraft.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, has long been Viet Nam's principal supplier of arms and aid. Only two months ago, Moscow and Hanoi signed a 25-year treaty of friendship that linked them even closer. Moscow last week speedily recognized the new regime in Phnom-Penh and harled the overthrow of Pol Pot.

Peking was plainly embarrassed by


the events, particularly since the capture of Cambodia's three major airports and lone seaport at Kompong Som ruled out any possibility of resupplying the tattered Kampuchean fighters. The Chinese contented themselves with beefing up their own forces along the Vietnamese border and hurling insults, mainly at the Soviets for supporting the invasion. "An aggressor's day of ascendancy," proclaimed an enigmatic statement released in Peking, "is the beginning of his defeat."

The successful invasion had been carried out so swiftly that it was a fait accompli before most parties were prepared to respond to it or to propose effective retaliation. Only the Japanese government acted decisively. Tokyo announced that it would delay promised grants and loans of \$70 million to Hanoi until the situation became clearer.

Elsewhere, the affair left foreign offices puzzled about which way to lean. The Rumanian government, once again at odds with Moscow, took Cambodia's side ing involved in a direct confrontate

Nations in Southeast Asia appearmore worried over the next step than last. In occupying Cambodia and instaing a friendly puppet government, Vietnamese Communists had taken another stride toward control of the dochinese peninsula. Having conquer South Viet Nam in a long and bloody will Hanoi had gone on to rule a puppet 1 gime in Laos with the aid of 30,000 Vietnamese soldiers. Cambodia was the ovious third target.

With that objective achieved, next of Hanoi's list could be the pro-Western go ernment in Bangkok. "The big question now," says a State Department officia "is whether Viet Nam will be tempted the future to push farther, perhaps in Thailand." Thai military leaders laweek were spending long "crisis hour at their desks, and one general even dused off an old contingency plan that cal for a pre-emptive Thai invasion of the Cambodian centers of Sisophon and Bal



Fleeing foreign diplomats and Chinese advisers await processing at Cambodian-Thai border
"An aggressor's day of ascendancy is the beginning of his defeat."

and declared that the ouster of Pol Pot was "a heavy blow for the prestige of socialism." Washington was almost bemused by the spectacle of one ferocious Communist nation pulverizing another. It was, said one senior Administration official, a case of "an abhorrent regime being overthrown by an abhorrent aggression."

Nevertheless, the U.S. came down on the side of Cambodia, despite its distaste for the Pol Pot government. The Vietnamese invasion, protested Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, "threatens regional peace and stability and violates the fundamental principle of the integrity of international borders." Washington's policy was to play the role of "a discreet referee," said Administration officials; the object was to keep Moscow and Peking from be com-

tambang as a buffer against any Vietnamese advance. Publicly, however, Bangkor authorities preferred to appear uncocerned. At his press briefings, Premerkriangsak insisted last week that "Trailand loves everybody. There is nothing a worry about as long as we Thai people are united."

More to the point, in Washingtons view, at least, was that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEA) remained united. Most of the memberstates—Thailand, Singapore, Malay Indonesia and the Philippines—recens soothing visits and pledges of "good nember borliness" last year from smilling namese Foreign Minister Nguyen Drinh. After the fall of Cambodia ASEAN lenders had good reusen to a strength of the guile behind the smile

Countries around the world condemn the invasion

Countries around the world quickly reacted to the invasion of Kampuchea. The following excerpts are drawn from the dozens of statements that were issued in defense of Kampuchea's sovereignty.

China (Government Jo People's Republic statement):

upholding countries and people to make joint efforts to safeguard the peace, security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole by exposing the Vietnamese-Soviet frauds and schemes, ple, sympathizing with and supporting their just standing by the bitterly fighting Kampuchean peo-"The Chinese government calls on all justiceDemocratic People's Republic of Korea (official newspaper Rodong Simmun):

month ago. How can it mobilize in such a short cluding so many planes, tanks and artillery pieces and regular armed forces of more than ten divisions? tional Salvation of Kampuchea' was formed about a period vast quantities of military equipment in-"Even according to the announcement of the Vietnamese side, the 'National United Front for the Na-

This surpasses the imagination of the ordinary

and immediately withdraw its armed forces from the Kampuchean territory."

Romania (Official newspaper Scinteia):

tory of Kampuchea and let the Kampuchean people ensure the socialist development of their country "It is necessary to halt military actions as soon as possible, withdraw all military forces from the terriaccording to their own will and aspirations."

Yugoslavia (Mirko Kalezic, Foreign Secretariat):

"Any foreign aggression or intervention under the pretext of disagreement with a country's internal social-political system or any other excuse is impermissible." Joint statement of the foreign ministers of the ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines):

armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea . . . (and) call for the immediate and total withdrawal of "The ASEAN ministers strongly deplore the all foreign forces from Kampuchean territory."

Zambia (G.C. Konie, UN Representative):

mine and destabilize the cohesion of the non-aligned movement and has serious implications, both for the "The present conflict involves two members of the non-aligned movement. This could seriously underregion and for international peace and security."

Bolivia (Mario Rolon Anaya, UN Representative):

"A government must not be imposed on a people from outside." Kuwait (Abdalia Yaccoub Bishara, UN Representative):

and as long as these foreign elements have a hand in the Cambodian problem, the situation will remain "There is foreign interference from identified and unidentified elements in the situation in Cambodia, explosive."

Norway (Ole Algard, UN Representative):

which may influence peace and stability beyond the region itself." flict, foreign intervention as well as interference in the internal affairs of another country in violation of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. The present conflict has also repercussions "The situation . . . is an example of armed con-

KAMPUCHEA SUPPORT COMMITTEE

List of Resources March 2, 1979

- 1. The best single periodical with ongoing news and analysis about Southeast Asia is Far Eastern Economic Review. The magazine is a weekly out of Hong Kong with minority ownership by the Wall Street Journal. It is available at many libraries and selected newsstands in the USA. Subscription can be either by sea or air (sea is about a month later. Subscription rates are \$29/year surface mail and \$47.50/year airmail. Subscriptions can be obtained by writing: Circulation Manager, Far Eastern Economic Review, GPO Box 160, Hongkong.
- 2. We would reccommend that all local chapters who are in a position to do ongoing Kampuchea support work get themselves on the mailing list of the Embassy of Democratic Kampuchea in Peking. Mailings are issued often but irregularly by the government, consisting of the Democratic Kampuchea News Bulletin and particular statements and news releases. Just write to the Embassy of Democratic Kampuchea, Peking, Peoples Republic of China and ask to be put on the mailing list. Unless you read French you should specify English. And if chapters write for these materials we suggest a friendly, solidarity letter, perhaps including your latest flyer or educational material.
- 3. Two sets of articles from the Southeast Asia Chronicle are helpful as background. The first is in the Human Rights issue, #58-59, December 1977. Two articles; "Human Rights and US-Southeast Asia Policy--The New Realpolitik," by Joel Rocamora, pages 1-4, and "Human Rights in Kampuchea--Distortions at Fourth Hand," by Moam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, pages 17-24. This article was originally published in the Nation, June 25, 1977 as a review of the following books: Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution by Hildebrand and Porter; Cambodge Annee Zero by Ponchaud; and Murder of a Gentle Land by Barron and Paul.

The second set is in the issue #64, September-October 1978 entitled "Two Views on the Vietnam-Kampuchea War." Of special note is the article "Origins of the Conflict"

by Stephen R. Heder, pages 3-18.

- 4. In order to get a good idea of how the official US media was treating the human rights question in Kampuchea prior to the invasion, the following: Shawcross, Willaim, "The Third Indochina War," The New York Review of Books, Vol XXV, No.5, April 6, 1978. This article is a review of: Communist Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia): Documents and Discussion, compiled by T.M.Carney; as well as the Barron & Paul and Hildebrand & Porter books listed in point 3 above.
- 5. The best books about the history of the struggle of the Kampuchean people for independence and freedom are the following four:

a. Caldwell, Malcolm and Tan, Lek. Cambodia in the Southeast Asian !lar. Mew York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1971 (available paperback)

b. Chomsky, Noam. At War With Asia. New York: Random House, 1970 (available paperback)

c. Hildebrand, George C. and Porter, Gareth. Cambodia: Starvation and Revolution. New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1976. (available hardcover)

d. Sihanouk, Prince Norodom as related to Wilfred Burchett. My Var With the CIA.

New York: Random House, 1973 (available paperback)

6. An excellent collection of materials about the human rights situation in Kampuchea prior to the invasion and material about the development of the border conflict through the first attempt at Vietnamese invasion in Dec 1977-Jan 1978 is called "The Revolution in Kampuchea: A Collection of Papers Edited by the Swedish-Kampuchean Friendship Association and the Norwegian-Kampuchean Friendship Association." This material was prepared in English for the International Cambodia Hearing which took place in Oslo, 21-23 April, 1978. Copies of this can be obtained through the MYC Staff.

7. The following are more recent materials available either from the publisher indicated or from the NYC Staff:

a. Pol Pot (unnofficial translation by the Group of Kampuchean Residents in America) "Long Live the 17th Anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea," speech delivered September 29, 1977. Liberator Press, PO Box 7128, Chicago, III. 60680. 71 pages, \$1.00

b. Ieng Sary, Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Foreign Affairs of Kampuchea, Chairman of the Delegation of Democratic Kampuchea at the 33rd Session of the UN General Assembly, speech delivered at the UN October 12, 1978. UNITY Publications

PO Box 26229, San Francisco, CA 94126. 19 pages, \$.50.

c. "Kampuchea Today," reports from the first American delegation to visit Kampuchea after liberation. Lots of particulars about living conditions and the organizatio of production and society. is available for \$2.25 from The Call, PO Box 5597, Chicag Ill 60680.

d. "Kampuchea Photo Book" by Robert Brown, text by David Kline. Photo record of the same delegation noted in #c above. Liberator Press, PO Box 7128, Chicago, Ill. 60680. 115 pages, paperback \$6.95.

e. "The Fighting Cambodia," report from a delegation of Chinese journalists right after liberation in 1975. Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1975. available from China Books and Periodicals in San Francisco, Chicago or New York. 60 pages, <.50.

8. The Kampuchea Support Committee itself has not yet developed its own original, up-to-date materials. These are in the works, however. At this time two pieces are useful:

a. "Democratic Kampuchea: Waging People's War," published by the New York City Coaling in Support of Democratic Kampuchea. includes a brief history of the Vietnamese Aggression since 1975; the January 11, 1979 statement of the government of Democratic Kampuchea; and the January 11, 1979 speech by Prince Norodom Sihanouk at the UN Securion Council. available from the NYC Staff, 34 pages, \$1.00.

b. we have limited copies of the speech given by the NYC Coalition at its forum in mid-February. It is helpful for an analysis of the invasion, a rundown of resistant to that time, and speaks to the Soviet/Vietnamese alliance and the causes of the inval

available from the NYC Staff.

This is a preliminary list. We will update it as soon as possible. There are several Kampuchean films available from the Group of Kampuchean Residents i America in New York. One is two hours long, titled "Democratic Kampuchea" about the situation inside the country in 1976-77. One is about the final liberation of the country, also about two hours. One is about the first round of serious Vietnamese/Kampuchean fighting in Dec. 1977, 30 minutes long. Please address all requests for literature or films to the New York Staff at the following address:

Kampuchea Support Committee c/o Joan London 41 St. Marks Place New York, New York 10003